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Using Artificial Intelligence in the
Law Review Submissions Process
Brenda M. Simon*
The use of artificial intelligence to help editors examine law review
submissions may provide a way to improve an overburdened system. This
Article is the first to explore the promise and pitfalls of using artificial
intelligence in the law review submissions process. Technology-assisted
review of submissions offers many possible benefits. It can simplify
preemption checks, prevent plagiarism, detect failure to comply with
formatting requirements, and identify missing citations. These efficiencies
may allow editors to address serious flaws in the current selection process,
including the use of heuristics that may result in discriminatory outcomes
and dependence on lower-ranked journals to conduct the initial review of
submissions. Although editors should not rely on a score assigned by an
algorithm to decide whether to accept an article, technology-assisted review
could increase the efficiency of initial screening and provide feedback to
editors on their selection decisions. Uncovering potential human bias in the
existing selection process may encourage editors to develop ways to
minimize its harmful effects.
Despite these benefits, using artificial intelligence to streamline the
submissions process raises significant concerns. Technology-assisted review
may enable efficient implementation of existing biases into the selection
process, rather than correcting them. Artificial intelligence systems may
rely on considerations that result in discriminatory effects and negatively
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impact groups that are not adequately represented during development. The
tendency to defer to seemingly neutral and often opaque algorithms can
increase the risk of adverse outcomes. With careful oversight, however,
some of these concerns can be addressed. Even an imperfect system may be
worth using in limited situations where the benefits substantially outweigh
the potential harms. With appropriate supervision, circumscribed
application, and ongoing refinement, artificial intelligence may provide a
more efficient and fairer submissions experience for both editors and
authors.
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INTRODUCTION
The law review submissions process has become untenable. Students
serving on law reviews are often inundated with over a thousand articles
each submission cycle.1 Law review editors currently use only basic
technological tools to filter the copious number of submissions received
each year, such as sorting by date, title, and keywords.2 Understandably,
they sometimes rely on questionable heuristics — law school affiliation,
author status, previous placements, even pressure from their own
professors3 — that can bias decision making and result in

1 See Christian I. Bale, Three Suggestions to Promote New Scholarship from an
Outgoing Editor-in-Chief, 71 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 47, 48 (2021) (“During the 2021 spring
selection period, DLJ received 1,368 manuscripts . . . .”); Leah M. Christensen & Julie
A. Oseid, Navigating the Law Review Article Selection Process: An Empirical Study of Those
with All the Power — Student Editors, 59 S.C. L. REV. 175, 203-05 (2007) (“Several other
editors from the Top 50 law schools reported that they received between 1,500 and
2,000 articles per year.”); Michael J. Higdon, Beyond the Metatheoretical: Implicit Bias in
Law Review Article Selection, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 339, 341 (2016) (stating that “law
reviews are reporting submission numbers as high as 2200”); cf. Barry Friedman, Fixing
Law Reviews, 67 DUKE L.J. 1297, 1305 (2018) (describing the selection of articles by
students).
2 See Law Review System, SCHOLASTICA, https://scholasticahq.com/law-reviews (last
visited July 25, 2021) [https://perma.cc/RT9U-ML57].
3 See Stephen Thomson, Letterhead Bias and the Demographics of Elite Journal
Publications, 33 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 203, 224 (2019) (finding that several of the top law
reviews had at least 20 percent of their articles authored by professors at their home
institutions); Albert H. Yoon, Editorial Bias in Legal Academia, 5 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 309,
310 (2013) (observing that “law reviews, with few exceptions, publish a higher
percentage of their articles from their own law faculty than from any other law school”).
But see Michael Conklin, Letterhead Bias and Blind Review: An Analysis of Prevalence and
Mitigation Efforts, 2022 U. ILL. L. REV. ONLINE 1, 9 (“The results support the notion that
letterhead bias is not a significant problem in legal academia and that blind review does
not significantly alter publication decisions. This research, however, only provides a
singular data point that must be considered in light of the contrasting evidence that
letterhead bias does exist.”); Kevin M. Yamamoto, What’s in a Name? The Letterhead
Impact Project, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. EDUC. 65, 67 (2004) (finding “no significant statistical
difference . . . in the time of response, type of response, or whether the article was
accepted” based on letterhead, although the study was limited to the submission of a
single article).
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discriminatory effects.4 Given existing disparities in academia,5 reliance
on these types of metrics can exacerbate inequality and inhibit the
recognition of valuable contributions. Article placement is the currency
of academia.6 It affects almost every aspect of the academic ecosystem,
from entry-level and lateral hiring to promotion and tenure, as well as
speaking opportunities and compensation.7 While anonymous review
would result in a less biased selection process, many law reviews lack
the capacity to devote the time and effort necessary to undertake the
examination involved.8 Proposals to address some of these concerns,

4 See James Lindgren, An Author’s Manifesto, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 527, 530 (1994)
(describing how editors screen articles based “on the prestige of the law school from
which the manuscript was submitted”); Thomson, supra note 3, at 210-13 (discussing
letterhead bias and other proxies for quality); Jonathan I. Tietz & W. Nicholson Price
II, Acknowledgments as a Window into Legal Academia, 98 WASH. U. L. REV. 307, 343
(2020) (“Heuristics are inevitable.”). But see Richard A. Posner, The Future of the
Student-Edited Law Review, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1131, 1133-34 (1995) (pointing to the
“reputation of the author” as a potential signal of quality).
5 See MEERA E. DEO, UNEQUAL PROFESSION: RACE AND GENDER IN LEGAL ACADEMIA 34 (2019) (describing the “challenges and opportunities associated with race and gender
that are unique to . . . underrepresented faculty”); Hannah Brenner, Expanding the
Pathways to Gender Equality in the Legal Profession, 17 LEGAL ETHICS 261, 275 (2014)
(describing “gender demographics in the legal academy”); Nancy Leong, Discursive
Disparities, 8 FIU L. REV. 369, 373 (2013) (“Disparities . . . permeate legal education.”).
6 See Anthony Michael Kreis, Picking Spinach, 50 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 395, 395 (2018)
(describing the significance of placement).
7 See id. at 395-96 (explaining that “law review articles are key in hiring,
promotion, and tenure decisions”); Stephen R. Heifetz, Efficient Matching: Reforming the
Market for Law Review Articles, 5 GEO. MASON L. REV. 629, 632 (1997) (“Decisions by
law school hiring and tenure committees are often influenced by the . . . name of the
law review in which the work appears.”).
8 See Friedman, supra note 1, at 1349-50 (“Review of articles ought to be blind.”);
Richard A. Wise, Lucy S. McGough, James W. Bowers, Douglas P. Peters, Joseph C.
Miller, Heather K. Terrell, Brett Holfeld & Joe H. Neal, Do Law Reviews Need Reform? A
Survey of Law Professors, Student Editors, Attorneys, and Judges, 59 LOY. L. REV. 1, 72-73,
75 (2013) (“The vast majority of legal professionals and student editors believe that law
reviews should . . . include blind, peer reviews and more student training.”); cf. Paul J.
Heald, The Law Review Scam: How to Humanely End Law School Exceptionalism 3 (Univ.
of Ill. Coll. of L. Legal Stud. Rsch. Paper, Paper No. 22-19, 2022),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4086728 [https://perma.cc/6U2MPGU6] (proposing that “universities should phase in a prospective rule that only peerreviewed articles count toward tenure”); Allen Rostron & Nancy Levit, Information for
Submitting Articles to Law Reviews & Journals (July 2022) (unpublished manuscript)
(available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1019029) (listing law
reviews with an anonymous screening policy); Lindgren, supra note 4, at 538
(proposing that law reviews “[c]onceal the author’s identity, gender, and institutional
affiliation from those selecting the articles”).

2022]

Using Artificial Intelligence

351

including limiting the practice of simultaneous submission or adopting
peer review, have not gained traction in law review submissions despite
their prevalence in fields like science, technology, and medicine.9
This Article is the first to describe how editors might use artificial
intelligence technology in the law review submissions process,
discussing its promise and pitfalls. Artificial intelligence has been
defined as “a set of techniques aimed at approximating some aspect of
human or animal cognition using machines.”10 It cannot engage in the
logical and critical reasoning skills necessary for substantively
evaluating submissions.11 Despite its deficiencies relative to human
intelligence, artificial intelligence can partially automate at least some
portion of the tasks associated with the selection process. It can simplify
the process of checking for preemption and detecting plagiarism.12
Editors can use screening tools to ensure that a submission respects
formatting requirements and that an author did not fail to cite relevant
articles.13 A partially automated system could assign a score to indicate
9 See Friedman, supra note 1, at 1352 (proposing mechanisms to improve the
article selection process, including requiring acceptance of the first offer received and
limiting the number of simultaneous submissions); Tietz & Price, supra note 4, at 31415 (noting that the practice of “formal peer review” generally does not exist in legal
scholarship); Wise et al., supra note 8, at 73 (describing a “Peer Reviewed Scholarship
Marketplace” that appears to be no longer in operation).
10 Ryan Calo, Artificial Intelligence Policy: A Primer and Roadmap, 51 UC DAVIS L.
REV. 399, 404 (2017).
11 The viability of such technology is questionable, though technology in the
artificial intelligence area is rapidly evolving. See Harry Surden, Machine Learning and
Law, 89 WASH. L. REV. 87, 88-89 (2014) [hereinafter Machine Learning] (“In the last few
decades, researchers have successfully used machine learning to automate a variety of
sophisticated tasks that were previously presumed to require human cognition.”);
Eugene Volokh, Chief Justice Robots, 68 DUKE L.J. 1135, 1182-91 (2019) (describing the
potential effects of artificial intelligence technology on judging); GPT-3, A Robot Wrote
This Entire Article. Are You Scared Yet, Human?, GUARDIAN (Sept. 8, 2020, 4:45 EDT),
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/sep/08/robot-wrote-this-articlegpt-3 [https://perma.cc/WJ58-YG54] (publishing an article written by OpenAI’s
language generator, GPT-3); Service, QATENT, https://qatent.com/service (last visited
Dec. 30, 2021) [https://perma.cc/9HP5-NVC7] (stating that its product can “in one
click, generate a description ready to be filed” based on a draft of patent claims).
12 Home, SCHOLARSIFT, https://www.scholarsift.com (last visited Dec. 21, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/3X5D-ZZTT]; Plagiarism Checker by Grammarly, GRAMMARLY,
https://www.grammarly.com/plagiarism-checker (last visited Jan. 29, 2022)
[https://perma.cc/3SCC-DRA3] (“Grammarly’s plagiarism checker detects plagiarism
. . . .”); Turnitin AI, TURNITIN, https://www.turnitin.com/ai (last visited Jan. 29, 2022)
[https://perma.cc/869W-UYHF] (“Using AI to compare writing styles, Turnitin insights
help indicate authorship.”).
13 Home, supra note 12; see Online Citation Generators, UNIV. OF WASH. GALLAGHER
L. LIBR., https://liblawuw.libguides.com/c.php?g=1236949&p=9051803 (last visited
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whether submissions meet certain requirements, such as word count,
increasing the efficiency of initial screening. Although a law review
editor could examine submissions in a similar manner, technologyassisted review would do so in a more efficient way and allow for
evaluation of a greater number of variables.14 By decreasing the time
spent triaging submissions, a partially automated system may give
editors additional time to focus their energy on those submissions that
are likely to benefit from further evaluation and to engage in
anonymized review on a broader scale.
In addition to assessing compliance with superficial requirements, a
partially automated system could help editors assess the completeness
of research in a given submission.15 Artificial intelligence can detect
whether a submission overlooks seminal cases, statutes, or articles in
specific areas of law.16 Technology-assisted review could augment the
ability of human editors, constrained by a narrower knowledge base, to
recognize the depth of research that a given submission encapsulates.17
Artificial intelligence can also provide a mechanism to evaluate the
current submissions process, potentially uncovering bias in human
editors.18 For instance, information about the author’s institutional
affiliation is unlikely to indicate the quality of a submission on an
individual basis, and its use may result in discriminatory outcomes
based on race or gender.19 If an editor otherwise would have declined
Feb. 2, 2022) [https://perma.cc/RB6T-GED6]; Text Analyzer, JSTOR LABS,
https://www.jstor.org/analyze (last visited Apr. 21, 2022) [https://perma.cc/5FEHHTJ6].
14 Cf. David Lehr & Paul Ohm, Playing with the Data: What Legal Scholars Should
Learn About Machine Learning, 51 UC DAVIS L. REV. 653, 670-71 (2017) (describing how
machine learning considers correlations between variables in making predictions).
15 Cf. Home, supra note 12 (describing the use of artificial intelligence to assess
“strengths and weaknesses in your research”).
16 Id.; Text Analyzer: About, JSTOR LABS, https://www.jstor.org/analyze/about (last
visited Apr. 21, 2022) [https://perma.cc/Y6Y4-HGXX] (“[Text Analyzer] analyzes the
text within the [uploaded] document to find key topics and terms used, and then uses
the ones it deems most important — the ‘prioritized terms’ — to find similar content in
JSTOR.”).
17 See infra Part II.A.1.
18 See Joshua A. Kroll, Joanna Huey, Solon Barocas, Edward W. Felten, Joel R.
Reidenberg, David G. Robinson & Harlan Yu, Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV.
633, 634 (2017) (describing how it is possible to “‘peer into the brain’ of an algorithm”
to ascertain bias); cf. Dominik Hangartner, Daniel Kopp & Michael Siegenthaler,
Monitoring Hiring Discrimination Through Online Recruitment Platforms, 589 NATURE 572
(2021) (discussing a study that used machine learning to monitor discrimination by
recruiters using employment websites).
19 See infra Part II.A.2.
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to engage in further review of a submission based on questionable
heuristics, a high score assigned by an algorithm might indicate that
implicit bias could be affecting the editor’s selection decision.20
Revealing human biases may enable development of ways to address
their effects.21 A less biased system of selecting articles for publication
could improve the submissions experience for both editors and authors,
promoting inclusiveness and enhancing the quality of legal
scholarship.22
Screening software is already being used to manage the torrent of
documents in numerous fields. During discovery in litigation, attorneys
use technology-assisted review to filter potentially millions of
documents that are unlikely to be relevant or to identify a smaller subset
of documents that need further review to determine if privilege exists.23
Employers regularly use hiring algorithms to assess whether job

20 See Jon Kleinberg, Jens Ludwig, Sendhil Mullainathan & Cass R. Sunstein,
Algorithms as Discrimination Detectors, 117 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 30096, 30100 (2020)
(“Introducing a data-driven decision aid creates additional opportunities to detect what
the humans in the system are doing, since we can test whether human compliance with
the tool’s recommendations, as opposed to override, is systematically lower or higher
for protected groups.”).
21 See Kroll et al., supra note 18, at 634.
22 Cf. Stephanie Bornstein, Antidiscriminatory Algorithms, 70 ALA. L. REV. 519, 572
(2018) (concluding that “technology has the potential to improve upon human
decision-making by suppressing or removing human biases”); Alex P. Miller, Want LessBiased Decisions? Use Algorithms, HARV. BUS. REV. (July 26, 2018), https://hbr.org/
2018/07/want-less-biased-decisions-use-algorithms
[https://perma.cc/7K3D-RQRR]
(“Algorithms deliver more-efficient and more-equitable outcomes.”). But cf. Ifeoma
Ajunwa, The Paradox of Automation as Anti-Bias Intervention, 41 CARDOZO L. REV. 1671,
1696-99 (2020) (describing the problems of relying on automated decision-making as
a way to address human bias).
23 See Herbert L. Roitblat, Anne Kershaw & Patrick Oot, Document Categorization
in Legal Electronic Discovery: Computer Classification vs. Manual Review, 61 J. AM. SOC’Y
INFO. SCI. & TECH. 70, 79 (2010) (concluding that categorizing relevant or responsive
documents by computer systems is “at least as accurate” as using human reviewers);
Harry Surden, Artificial Intelligence and Law: An Overview, 35 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1305,
1329-30 (2019) [hereinafter Artificial Intelligence and the Law] (“This automated-review
software became necessary with the rise of e-discovery, as the document troves related
to particular lawsuits began to rise into the hundreds of thousands and sometimes
millions of documents . . . .”); Maggie Burtoft, Electronic Discovery Document Review:
The Power of Feedback, LAW.COM (Oct. 21, 2021, 11:50 AM), https://www.law.com/2021/
10/21/electronic-discovery-document-review-the-power-of-feedback [https://perma.cc/
H9D6-HDPS] (explaining that “discovery teams can curb review costs by employing
early case assessment methods to reduce the volume of documents requiring review and
technology-assisted review to identify responsive documents”).
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applications should receive further consideration.24 More closely
related, many scientific journals have incorporated artificial intelligence
into their submissions screening processes.25 The use of such
techniques has drawn criticism, however, because of their potential to
replicate existing biases.26 For example, a hiring algorithm learned to
penalize job applications that mentioned the word “women’s” because
developers trained it using resumes primarily submitted by men.27
Technology-assisted review could similarly complement in-depth
substantive review by law review editors,28 but its use raises significant
concerns. A partially automated system may negatively impact certain
groups that are not adequately represented in the process of training the
system.29 For example, if developers use examples of publications from
a limited number of fields of study, the system will not be able to
accurately assign scores for research comprehensiveness to submissions
in less common topic areas. Incompleteness in the representativeness of
data is amplified because predictive technology relies on a limited
amount of data to draw broad conclusions.30 To the extent developers

24 See Miranda Bogen, All the Ways Hiring Algorithms Can Introduce Bias, HARV. BUS.
REV. (May 6, 2019), https://hbr.org/2019/05/all-the-ways-hiring-algorithms-canintroduce-bias [https://perma.cc/EMF9-X67N] (describing the different applications of
algorithms in the hiring process).
25 See infra Part I.B.1.
26 See Ajunwa, supra note 22, at 1708 (explaining that “the biased results of
algorithmic hiring systems . . . reveal legal anachronisms, such as an American tradition
of deference to the employer”); Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate
Impact, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 671, 674 (2016) (“Approached without care, data mining can
reproduce existing patterns of discrimination, inherit the prejudice of prior decision
makers, or simply reflect the widespread biases that persist in society.”); Bogen, supra
note 24 (describing how hiring algorithms can “replicate institutional and historical
biases”); infra Parts I.B.1, II.B.
27 See Jeffrey Dastin, Amazon Scraps Secret AI Recruiting Tool that Showed Bias
Against Women, REUTERS (Oct. 10, 2018, 4:04 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/usamazon-com-jobs-automation-insight/amazon-scraps-secret-ai-recruiting-tool-thatshowed-bias-against-women-idUSKCN1MK08G [https://perma.cc/2H7G-6DY7]; infra
Part II.B.2.
28 See Frank Pasquale, A Rule of Persons, Not Machines: The Limits of Legal
Automation, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 46-48 (2019) (discussing how artificial
intelligence could assist human intelligence without displacing it); Volokh, supra note
11, at 1149 (describing how “early AIs will be aimed at helping human decisionmakers
. . . rather than supplanting them”).
29 See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 26, at 677-93 (describing how discriminatory
outcomes may occur when a machine learning system is trained using data that is not
representative); infra Part II.B.2.
30 See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 26, at 686-90.
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train the system based on past determinations of article strength, such
as only highly-cited articles or those published in top ten law reviews,
the system may not accurately assign a score for submissions in
emerging areas of law or those that use unique writing styles.31 The
opacity of many types of partially automated systems, coupled with
misplaced deference to seemingly neutral algorithms, magnifies the risk
of adverse outcomes.32
Individuals involved in developing the technology may have biases,
which they unintentionally incorporate into the technology.33 The
system might assign lower scores to papers based on features that
contain embedded bias or proxies for protected characteristics of
authors, such as the law school the author attended.34 Developers might
also use data that contains systemic bias to teach the technology how to
score submissions.35 For instance, an algorithm that relies on the
placement of an author’s previous articles in highly-ranked journals to

31 See Lehr & Ohm, supra note 14, at 680 (describing the importance of
“generalizability — the ability of an algorithm trained on a particular dataset to generate
accurate predictions when deployed on different data”); Surden, Machine Learning,
supra note 11, at 105 (describing how a model is “thus only useful to the extent that the
heuristics inferred from past cases can be extrapolated to predict novel cases”); cf.
Gaillynn Clements, An Unexpected Irony: Lifting the “Diversity” Wool from our Eyes, in
LINGUISTIC DISCRIMINATION IN U.S. HIGHER EDUCATION: POWER, PREJUDICE, IMPACTS, AND
REMEDIES 1, 4-6 (Gaillynn Clements & Marnie Jo Petray eds., 2021) (describing how
“universities set a medium of instruction . . . which is necessary for idea sharing
(including publishing)” and that “language discrimination is a proxy for racial, ethnic,
regional, social class, and gender discrimination”).
32 See Ajunwa, supra note 22, at 1686 (explaining how “the belief in data objectivity
then often results in an uncritical acceptance of decisions derived from such algorithmic
systems”); Douglas Heaven, AI Peer Reviewers Unleashed to Ease Publishing Grind, 563
NATURE 609, 610 (2018) (stating that “there might be temptation for editors to cut
corners and simply rely on [an assigned] score in deciding to reject a paper”); Surden,
Artificial Intelligence and the Law, supra note 23, at 1337 (discussing how decision
makers might “inappropriately defer to this false precision, failing to take into account
the limits of the model, the uncertainties involved, the subjective decisions that went
into the model’s creation,” and the rate of false negatives); Ari Ezra Waldman, Power,
Process, and Automated Decision-Making, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 613, 619 (2019)
(describing how the “opacity of decision-making algorithms prevents those harmed by
automated systems from determining either how a decision came about or the logic and
reasoning behind it”).
33 See Waldman, supra note 32, at 621-22.
34 See infra Part II.A.2.
35 See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 26, at 684-87; Surden, Artificial Intelligence and
the Law, supra note 23, at 1336 (“There is a concern that automated AI-enhanced
decisions may disproportionately appear to be more neutral, objective, and accurate
than they actually are.”).
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predict the strength of a new submission may incorporate racial bias.36
To the extent that editors currently consider such information as an
indication of submission strength, partial automation may simply
enable efficient implementation of existing biases rather than correcting
them. In addition, a partially automated system may be too costly for
widespread adoption, excluding those institutions and editors that
might benefit most from it and enabling strategic gaming for authors
with institutional access.37
With careful development, limited application, and attentive
oversight — including conducting regular audits for discriminatory
outcomes and requiring measured transparency — some of these harms
can be addressed.38 The potential gains from using artificial intelligence
may make an imperfect system worth considering in circumscribed
applications.39 For instance, although one would not want to rely on
Google Translate for matters of significance — such as translating a
contract — it still provides a resource where one might otherwise not
exist, like interpreting a menu at a restaurant.40 Similarly, editors should
not rely on a score assigned by artificial intelligence to decide whether
to accept an article. However, technology-assisted review can streamline
assessment of stylistic requirements for submissions, allowing editors
36

See infra Part II.A.2.
See infra Part III.
38 See id.; cf. Harini Suresh & John Guttag, A Framework for Understanding Sources
of Harm Throughout the Machine Learning Life Cycle, ACM DIGIT. LIBR., Oct. 2021, at 78, https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/3465416.3483305 [https://perma.cc/66MR-FJ4R]
(setting forth a “framework to provide a useful organizational structure for thinking
through potential problems, understanding if and what mitigation techniques are
appropriate, and/or motivating new ones”).
39 See Surden, Machine Learning, supra note 11, at 88 (“While the results of these
automated efforts are sometimes imperfect, the interesting point is that such computer
generated results have often proven useful for particular tasks where strong
approximations are acceptable.”).
40 See id. at 100 (“Such automation has allowed for approximate but useful
translations in many contexts where no translation was previously available at all.”);
Translation AI, GOOGLE CLOUD, https://cloud.google.com/translate/#how-automltranslationbeta-works (last visited July 25, 2021) [https://perma.cc/B2RR-P6PQ]; cf.
Alessandro Checco, Lorenzo Bracciale, Pierpaolo Loreti, Stephen Pinfield & Giuseppe
Bianchi, AI-Assisted Peer Review, 8 HUMANS. & SOC. SCIS. COMMC’NS. 1, 2 (2021)
(discussing the use of an “Automated Essay Scoring (AES) application” that MIT,
Harvard, and EdX use “to assess written work in their MOOCs”); Cade Metz, Can A.I.
Grade Your Next Test?, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/
07/20/technology/ai-education-neural-networks.html
[https://perma.cc/S48B-8CZ3]
(describing Stanford University’s use of automated feedback in one of its online
courses).
37
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the time to substantively examine a greater number of submissions.41
The use of artificial intelligence might also address serious
shortcomings in the current selection process, providing feedback to
editors about biases in their decision-making and minimizing the
overreliance on lower-ranked journals to conduct the initial screening
of submissions.42
This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I describes the foundational
concepts of using artificial intelligence technology to comb through
submissions in a variety of fields. Part II examines the potential benefits
and risks of implementing technology-assisted review in the law review
submissions process. Part III sets forth possible mechanisms for
mitigating the potential harms identified and offers measured
suggestions for using artificial intelligence in the law review
submissions process. By recognizing the limitations of artificial
intelligence, law review editors may be able to use technology-assisted
review in ways that provide for a more effective and less biased
submissions experience.
I.

USING ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE TO HELP SCREEN SUBMISSIONS

Artificial intelligence develops and uses technology to execute tasks
that ordinarily depend on human intelligence.43 Common examples of
artificial intelligence include image and speech recognition and
language translation.44 Algorithms are essentially the automated
instructions that form the foundation of artificial intelligence.45
Machine learning is a subset of artificial intelligence that trains
machines how to learn to do a variety of things.46 Machine learning
41

See infra Part II.C.
Joseph Scott Miller, The Immorality of Requesting Expedited Review, 21 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 211, 214-15 (2017) (“The work [editors at lower ranked journals] do is
redistributed up the prestige hierarchy, never to return.”).
43 IBM Cloud Education, Artificial Intelligence (AI), IBM (June 3, 2020),
https://www.ibm.com/cloud/learn/what-is-artificial-intelligence [https://perma.cc/8V9NJHHZ].
44 Id.; see Surden, Artificial Intelligence and the Law, supra note 23, at 1307
(“Researchers have successfully applied AI technology to automate some complex
activities, including playing chess, translating languages, and driving vehicles.”).
45 Stephen F. DeAngelis, Artificial Intelligence: How Algorithms Make Systems Smart,
WIRED (Sept. 2014), https://www.wired.com/insights/2014/09/artificial-intelligencealgorithms-2 [https://perma.cc/M677-UADH].
46 MEHRYAR MOHRI, AFSHIN ROSTAMIZADEH & AMEET TALWALKAR, FOUNDATIONS OF
MACHINE LEARNING 1-3 (2d ed. 2018); Machine Learning: What It Is and Why It Matters,
SAS, https://www.sas.com/en_us/insights/analytics/machine-learning.html (last visited
July 15, 2021) [https://perma.cc/U3DP-SL6S].
42
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methods work by detecting patterns in vast amounts of data and then
applying the patterns to accomplish a given task — from recommending
videos to driving a vehicle.47 For example, a consumer’s credit card
company analyzes data about purchases using machine learning.48
Information related to the date, location, and amount of each
transaction is structured data that helps the machine learning algorithm
define a typical transaction for a given user. Consequently, if a user
typically makes purchases in New York, the machine learning algorithm
will view purchases in Texas as a deviation, and the credit card company
may stop the transaction.
Artificial intelligence systems sometimes appear to complete tasks
that involve cognitive abilities.49 They perform these tasks using proxies
to represent foundational elements, concepts, or features.50 For
example, machine learning can use pattern detection to infer proxies for
lower quality emails, such as the use of all capital letters or country of
origin to detect spam.51 Thus, even though the technology does not
examine the meaning of the email itself, it can still be useful in filtering
email.52 It is difficult for these systems, however, to classify text
associated with an abstract objective.53
Although algorithms are mathematical, they are not neutral. In a
supervised learning approach, the data used to train the machine
learning algorithms is carefully selected, organized, and validated by

47 Machine Learning: What It Is and Why It Matters, supra note 46; see Sharona
Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, Artificial Intelligence and Discrimination in Health Care, 19
YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L., & ETHICS 1, 8 (2020).
48 Machine Learning: What It Is and Why It Matters, supra note 46.
49 See Volokh, supra note 11, at 1137-38 (arguing that the focus should not be
“whether we recognize its reasoning processes as intelligent,” but “whether the output
of those processes provides what we need”); Surden, Artificial Intelligence and the Law,
supra note 23, at 1330 (describing how artificial intelligence is not able to make
decisions that “involve understanding the law and the facts and dealing with strategy,
policy, and other abstractions”). But see Brian Haney, Patents for NLP Software: An
Empirical Review, 18 IUP J. KNOWLEDGE MGMT. 27, 37 (2020) (explaining that
“developing software exhibiting common sense reasoning at human level is a formidable
problem”).
50 See Surden, Machine Learning, supra note 11, at 95.
51 See id. at 96-97.
52 See id.
53 See id. at 113 (explaining that “algorithms are not well suited to, or intended to,
apply legal judgment in nuanced, uncertain areas”); Haney, supra note 49, at 40 (“NLP
software processing information often assists human decision makers, rather than
making decisions autonomously.”).
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people.54 Unlike traditional algorithms, in which a developer explicitly
programs the decision-making rules, developers in machine learning
systems select the training data (past examples) and label outputs.55 The
training data then enables the creation of a model that the machine
learning system can use to analyze new situations and make
predictions.56 Machine learning algorithms are able to create more
intricate models by discovering new patterns in the data.57 As the
machine learning algorithms evaluate more data and identify additional
patterns in the data, their decision-making ability improves.58 To be
effective, machine learning requires “large amounts of high-quality,
structured, machine-processable data,” so it will not perform as well
where data is lacking in quantity or quality.59 The better the data, the
better the algorithm should perform — absent any bias that has made
its way into the learning process.60
Developers use natural language processing (“NLP”) techniques in
language-focused artificial intelligence systems; they too require
enormous quantities of human-provided data to be effective.61
54 This Article will focus on supervised learning approaches. See Surden, Machine
Learning, supra note 11, at 91-94 (offering a spam filtering algorithm as an example of
a supervised learning approach); cf. Barocas & Selbst, supra note 26, at 678 n.24 (“Other
techniques known as ‘unsupervised’ learning do not require any such target variables
and instead search for general structures in the dataset, rather than patterns specifically
related to some state or outcome.”); Lehr & Ohm, supra note 14, at 676 (“Unsupervised
learning algorithms do not predict outcome variables labeled with ground truth.
Instead, they group or cluster subjects together based, roughly speaking, on how similar
their input data values are.”).
55 See Jason R. Bent, Is Algorithmic Affirmative Action Legal?, 108 GEO. L.J. 803, 809
(2020); Ignacio N. Cofone, Algorithmic Discrimination Is an Information Problem, 70
HASTINGS L.J. 1389, 1395 (2019).
56 See Surden, Machine Learning, supra note 11, at 91-94.
57 See id. at 94; Emily Berman, A Government of Laws and Not of Machines, 98 B.U.
L. REV. 1277, 1279 (2018) (explaining that machine learning allows for the “extraction
of implicit knowledge by discovering patterns or relationships within a data set”).
58 See Surden, Machine Learning, supra note 11, at 93-94 (“Such algorithms are
powerful because, in a sense, these algorithms program themselves over time with the
rules to accomplish a task, rather than being programmed manually with a series of predetermined rules.”); What Is Machine Learning?: How It Works, Why It Matters, and
Getting Started, MATHWORKS, https://www.mathworks.com/discovery/machinelearning.html (last visited July 15, 2021) [https://perma.cc/VVP3-HJYZ].
59 Surden, Artificial Intelligence and the Law, supra note 23, at 1316.
60 See id. at 1316, 1335-36.
61 IBM Cloud Education, Natural Language Processing (NLP), IBM (July 2, 2020),
https://www.ibm.com/cloud/learn/natural-language-processing [https://perma.cc/32AT9XYV]; see also Prakash M. Nadkarni, Lucila Ohno-Machado & Wendy W. Chapman,
Natural Language Processing: An Introduction, 18 J. AM. MED. INFO. ASS’N 544, 544-45
(2011) (providing an overview of NLP and its limitations).
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Developers can train an NLP model to examine individual words, the
sequence and grouping of words, as well as the layout and formatting
of a document.62 The NLP model could then process a new document.63
Systems using NLP techniques may face difficulty evaluating
complicated documents.64
The following discussion will touch on the use of artificial
intelligence in screening submissions in a variety of areas, and then
describe its current application in the submissions process for scientific
journals and law reviews.
A. Examples of Screening Technology in Other Fields
Artificial intelligence technology can be trained to sort through vast
quantities of data in an efficient and effective way. This Section provides
examples of how automated technology can help sift through
documents during litigation discovery, assist in examination of patent
applications by the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“Patent
Office”), and filter resumes for further review in the hiring process.
Although these partially automated mechanisms increase efficiency,
they also raise serious concerns about discrimination and bias.65
In civil litigation, parties often exchange volumes of documents
during the discovery process.66 Discovery is the means of gathering and
reviewing evidence in litigation.67 Prior to the emergence of electronic
discovery (“e-discovery”), armies of junior attorneys used to sift
through troves of materials to determine if a document was potentially
relevant to the matter at issue or privileged or both.68 Electronic
discovery facilitated the development of partially automated document
62

See Spencer Williams, Predictive Contracting, 2019 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 621, 653.
See id.
64 Checco et al., supra note 40, at 4.
65 See infra Part II.B.
66 See Burtoft, supra note 23; Surden, Artificial Intelligence and the Law, supra note
23, at 1329-30.
67 Surden, Artificial Intelligence and the Law, supra note 23, at 1329-30.
68 See id. (noting that “human review of documents will continue to play a huge
part in the e-discovery process”); MARTIN FORD, RISE OF THE ROBOTS: TECHNOLOGY AND
THE THREAT OF A JOBLESS FUTURE 124 (2015) (describing the replacement of lawyers and
paralegals by “powerful algorithms that can analyze millions of documents and
automatically tease out” those that are likely to be relevant); Charles Yablon & Nick
Landsman-Roos, Predictive Coding: Emerging Questions and Concerns, 64 S.C. L. REV.
633, 637 (2013) (“The use of technology-assisted review began around 2008, when a
small number of law firms started exploring ways in which they could use computers
and sophisticated software to make the discovery review process more efficient.”).
63
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review, known as “predictive coding” or “technology-assisted review.”69
Predictive-coding systems are able to filter massive amounts of
discovery documents — sometimes numbering in the millions — to a
manageable amount of material by removing those that are very likely
to be irrelevant.70 These systems are not very useful for determining if a
document is likely or even slightly relevant, but they are helpful in
figuring out the documents that are very likely not relevant.71 Attorneys
then review the subset of documents highlighted as needing further
review to determine if the documents are in fact relevant or qualify for
an assertion of privilege.72 By using patterns to sort documents, the
predictive-coding technology is able to remove the documents that are
least likely to be relevant to the matter at issue, preserving valuable time
for attorney review of only those documents that are more likely to be
relevant.73
The use of predictive coding in e-discovery exposes some limitations
in using technology-assisted review to help classify documents.
Although predictive coding technology can identify discovery
documents likely to be irrelevant, the ultimate decision of relevance or
privilege must be made by human attorneys.74 Within e-discovery, there
are some tasks that lend themselves to partial automation.75 There may
be certain rules that an artificial intelligence system can recognize. For
example, in a matter involving employment discrimination, the
reviewing attorney could train the predictive coding technology to
search for terms that might raise concern, such as expletives, or the
technology might learn new terms based on its analysis of previous
discrimination cases.76

69

Yablon & Landsman-Roos, supra note 68, at 637.
Id.
71 See Surden, Machine Learning, supra note 11, at 113.
72 Id. (explaining that “the algorithms perform the role of filtering down the size of
the document stack that is ultimately in need of lawyerly review”).
73 Yablon & Landsman-Roos, supra note 68, at 638.
74 Surden, Artificial Intelligence and the Law, supra note 23, at 1330.
75 See, e.g., Surden, Machine Learning, supra note 11, at 104 (describing how “an
algorithm may identify a complex mix of factors in the data associated with particular
outcomes that may be hard or impossible for an attorney to detect using typical legal
analysis methods”); About Us, LEX MACHINA, https://lexmachina.com/about (last visited
Jan. 2, 2022) [https://perma.cc/7E92-VPQ7] (describing legal analytics software, which
“mines and processes litigation data, revealing insights never before available about . . .
the subjects of the cases themselves, culled from millions of pages of litigation
information”).
76 See Surden, Machine Learning, supra note 11, at 105; About Us, supra note 75.
70
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Similarly, the Patent Office uses artificial intelligence to help manage
a massive volume of applications filed each year.77 Patent examiners use
machine learning technology to enhance their ability to identify
documents relevant to evaluating applications.78 In this context,
machine learning algorithms can organize the immense amount of prior
art. Prior art is defined as the materials that set forth the state of the art
at the time the patent application was filed.79 Searching for and
reviewing prior art is a time-consuming yet essential undertaking, as it
is critical in assessing whether an invention is sufficiently new and
nonobvious to deserve patent protection.80 Although the Patent Office
uses machine learning to limit the expanse of prior art, patent examiners
must ultimately decide whether a patent should be granted after
evaluating the prior art and comparing it to the application at issue.81
As another example, computerized sorting mechanisms are widely
used to narrow the pool of applications in the hiring process.82
Algorithms identify candidates that companies might want to pursue,
and they are used to target job advertisements to a select group of
potential candidates.83 Predictive technologies can help employers sift
77 Arti K. Rai, Machine Learning at the Patent Office: Lessons for Patents and
Administrative Law, 104 IOWA L. REV. 2617, 2619 (2019) (“The Patent Office receives
hundreds of thousands of patent applications every year, and the examiners who
process the applications operate under severe time pressure.”).
78 See, e.g., Lehr & Ohm, supra note 14, at 671 (defining machine learning as “an
automated process of discovering correlations (sometimes alternatively referred to as
relationships or patterns) between variables in a dataset, often to make predictions or
estimates of some outcome”); Rai, supra note 77, at 2618 (describing the use of machine
learning at the Patent Office); Surden, Artificial Intelligence and the Law, supra note 23,
at 1311 (defining machine learning as “a family of AI techniques” that “work by
detecting useful patterns in large amounts of data”).
79 See Rai, supra note 77, at 2619, 2634 (“[M]achine learning could be particularly
useful for the time-intensive but critical task of searching the prior learning (‘prior art’)
to determine whether, at the time of patent filing, the invention claimed was novel and
nonobvious.”); Brenda M. Simon, Rules, Standards, and the Reality of Obviousness, 65
CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 25, 28 (2014) (describing how “increased access to searchable
information and processing power provides additional time to consider a wider range
of prior art”).
80 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(a), 103 (2018); Rai, supra note 77, at 2619, 2634 (describing
the use of machine learning in prior art searching); Brenda M. Simon, The Implications
of Technological Advancement for Obviousness, 19 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 331,
346 (2013) (explaining that “the quality of prior art located for a given application is
limited by time, ability, interest, and resources”).
81 See Rai, supra note 77, at 2631.
82 Bogen, supra note 24.
83 Id.
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through a deluge of applications. For better or worse, almost threequarters of resumes never make it past the digital gatekeepers.84
Companies score, rank, and screen applicants using application
tracking systems.85 Software compares applicants against the profile of
an “ideal candidate.”86 To increase scores, commentators have
suggested candidates use standard fonts, remove images, and include
standard industry acronyms as well as language found in the job
listing.87 Researchers have described how the use of hiring algorithms
reproduces existing biases and has had discriminatory effects, which
will be described in greater detail below.88
B. Technology-Assisted Review of Journal Submissions
Editors in different fields already use some form of partially
automated technology in reviewing submissions. This Section details
the current use of artificial intelligence by scientific journals and law
reviews. Even partial automation of certain aspects of the submissions
process carries the potential for substantial harm.
1.

Using Artificial Intelligence in Scientific Journal Submissions

The volume of submissions has strained the feasibility of peer review
for scientific journals.89 Editors have already started to adopt partially
automated screening tools, though their use has raised significant
concerns.90 Modest advances in technology have enabled journals to
reduce screening time by confirming a submission complies with

84 Mona Abdel-Halim, 12 Ways to Optimize Your Resume for Applicant Tracking
Systems, MASHABLE (May 27, 2012), https://mashable.com/2012/05/27/resume-trackingsystems [https://perma.cc/FE78-LCPV]; see infra Part II.B.3.
85 Abdel-Halim, supra note 84.
86 Jessica Leber, The Machine-Readable Workforce, MIT TECH. REV. (May 27, 2013),
https://www.technologyreview.com/2013/05/27/178320/the-machine-readableworkforce [https://perma.cc/Z6U6-BQYE].
87 Abdel-Halim, supra note 84.
88 See Dastin, supra note 27; Cathy O’Neil, Amazon’s Gender-Biased Algorithm Is Not
Alone, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 16, 2018, 6:00 AM PDT), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/
articles/2018-10-16/amazon-s-gender-biased-algorithm-is-not-alone [https://perma.cc/
72T4-78BE]; infra Part II.B.2.
89 Checco et al., supra note 40, at 2 (stating that submissions have grown annually
by 6.1% since 2013, and estimating that “over 15 million hours are spent every year on
reviewing of manuscripts previously rejected and then resubmitted to other journals”).
90 Id.; Jef Akst, Researchers to CIHR: Reverse Peer Review Changes, SCIENTIST (July 5,
2016),
https://www.the-scientist.com/the-nutshell/researchers-to-cihr-reverse-peerreview-changes-33236 [https://perma.cc/HS5A-MEYD].
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formatting requirements.91 More sophisticated software, such as
statcheck or StatReviewer, can verify statistical analysis and methods,
although some have questioned their validity and reliability.92 Editors
use other technologies to locate suitable peer reviewers or serve as an
adjunct in quality screening.93
One of the more sophisticated automated tools, UNSILO, claims to be
able to analyze the content of submissions using machine learning and
natural language processing; it attempts to glean the main points from
a submission to create a summary.94 Rather than using the authors’ selfidentified key words, UNSILO attempts to extract key concepts to
summarize results, ascertain the likelihood of plagiarism, and
determine how the submission relates to the broader literature.95 These
systems must examine a large corpus of documents to analyze new
91 See
Checco et al., supra note 40, at 2-3; see, e.g., CLARIVATE,
https://clarivate.com/webofsciencegroup/solutions/scholarone (last visited Dec. 21,
2021) [https://perma.cc/9RHM-6K22] (discussing “AI-powered metadata extraction and
submission filtering”); OVERLEAF, https://www.overleaf.com/for/publishers#benefits (last
visited Dec. 21, 2021) [https://perma.cc/7MCX-AFDB] (stating that the “automated
Overleaf pre-submission check system” ensures submissions are correctly formatted);
PENELOPE, https://www.penelope.ai (last visited Dec. 21, 2021) [https://perma.cc/SDL9QDRM] (describing a resource that can assess whether the citations and format of a
submission comply with the journal’s requirements).
92 STATCHECK, http://statcheck.io (last visited Dec. 21, 2021) [https://perma.cc/W22BZEW2]; STATREVIEWER, http://www.statreviewer.com (last visited Dec. 21, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/4DWL-6ENP]; see also Heaven, supra note 32, at 609-10 (describing
how statcheck “assesses the consistency of authors’ statistics reporting” while
StatReviewer “checks that papers correctly include things such as sample sizes,
information about blinding of subjects and baseline data”); Thomas Schmidt, Statcheck
Does Not Work: All the Numbers. Reply to Nuijten et al., PSYARXIV (Nov. 22, 2017),
https://psyarxiv.com/hr6qy [https://perma.cc/HZZ5-UXYR] (raising concerns about the
validity and reliability of statcheck).
93 See, e.g., Checco et al., supra note 40, at 2 (describing the use of an “Automated
Essay Scoring (AES) application, used by EdX, MIT and Harvard’s non-profit MOOC
federation to assess written work in their MOOCs”); Lorcan Reilly, About Web of Science
Reviewer Locator, CLARIVATE, https://publons.freshdesk.com/support/solutions/articles/
12000047301-about-web-of-science-reviewer-locator (last updated Aug. 18, 2022)
[https://perma.cc/QDX5-337V] (describing its services as a way to “find, screen, and
connect with the subject matter experts needed to peer review manuscript
submissions”).
94 Technology, UNSILO, https://web.archive.org/web/20211127073000/https://unsilo.ai/
technology/ [https://perma.cc/5ZNR-N9QQ] (last visited Aug. 16, 2022); Heaven, supra
note 32, at 609.
95 Technology, supra note 94; Heaven, supra note 32, at 609 (describing the
development of “software that can mine paper databases and extract connections
between
different
disciplines
and
concepts”);
see
also
WIZDOM.AI,
https://www.wizdom.ai (last visited Dec. 21, 2021) [https://perma.cc/WKV5-Y3EF].
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papers adequately.96 In comparing submissions with previously
published works, UNSILO draws upon 1.7 million research papers from
the PubMed Central database, and claims that it is in the process of
augmenting its databases with an additional twenty million papers.97
As an example of the possibilities and risks of using artificial
intelligence in screening submissions, a recent empirical study
examined whether an artificial intelligence tool could successfully
predict the peer review score of an unreviewed manuscript through the
use of its textual content alone.98 A group of researchers designed and
trained the tool using 3,300 papers and the peer review evaluations of
those papers.99 They trained it to evaluate papers based on formatting,
textual content (the frequency with which words were used), and
readability (the size of words, complexity of vocabulary, and sentence
length).100 Despite such a superficial review, the system was frequently
able to predict the peer review results.101 The authors found the
existence of correlations between decision-making and the limited
quality proxy measures described above, suggesting that partial
automation may be able to play a role in the review process.102 They also
describe how a partially automated system would allow reviewers “to
focus more on the scientific content” of a given submission.103
The ability to predict peer review scores based on a superficial
examination of an unreviewed manuscript may indicate bias in the
review process.104 A system using artificial intelligence to screen papers
might have a higher rejection rate than a standard peer review system
for papers on “innovative topics” or those that contain characteristics
associated with lower-income countries.105 Papers from disadvantaged
regions have been historically underrepresented in the literature, and
the system might not recognize the improving quality of papers
submitted from these regions over time.106 If the system is trained on
papers selected by editors who have relied on American reviewers that

96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106

Technology, supra note 94; see Heaven, supra note 32, at 609.
Technology, supra note 94.
Checco et al., supra note 40, at 3.
Id. at 1.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 9.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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tend to favor papers from higher-income regions,107 an automated
system may perpetuate biases against submissions from lower-income
countries.108 Other researchers have also described how screening
technology that has been trained using published papers might
perpetuate biases that already exist in peer review.109
Many in the scientific research community have raised other concerns
about the potential for adverse outcomes in using automated techniques
to evaluate submissions.110 They have criticized the validity and
reliability of automated technology used to assess the consistency of a
submission’s statistical analysis.111 Researchers also worry that if the
automated screening technology allocates a single score after
evaluation, editors could place too much weight on the score in
rejecting submissions.112 In the context of grant review, almost 1,200
researchers criticized the decision of the Canadian Institutes of Health
Research to transition from in-person meetings for peer review panels
to an online system for grant evaluation.113 Researchers found that in
the new online evaluation, female applicants “fared significantly worse
than their male counterparts, and younger researchers received less
money than more-senior faculty” as compared with the prior system.114
They believe the quality of the review process suffered, at least in part,
from the failure of reviewers to evaluate the proposals in consultation
with the other scientists.115

107 Id. (describing how the United States “dominates the contribution to peer
review”).
108 See id. (explaining that “a model may propagate cultural and organisational biases
already present in the learning set”).
109 Heaven, supra note 32, at 610.
110 See, e.g., id. (discussing the “potential pitfalls to AI in peer review in general”);
Cassidy R. Sugimoto, Scientific Success by Numbers, 593 NATURE 30, 31 (2021)
(criticizing the use of journal impact factors); Schmidt, supra note 92, at 4 (“Statcheck
has low validity, misses many inconsistent tests and makes many false alarms.”).
111 See Schmidt, supra note 92, at 4.
112 Heaven, supra note 32, at 610 (describing the temptation for editors to “cut
corners” and rely on assigned scores in rejecting papers); cf. Julia Angwin, Jeff Larson,
Surya Mattu & Lauren Kirchner, Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016),
https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing
[https://perma.cc/C8FA-3ZM4] (stating that although “judges are not supposed to give
longer sentences to defendants with higher risk scores . . . [they] have cited scores in
their sentencing decisions”).
113 Akst, supra note 90.
114 Id.
115 Id.
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More than 20,000 individuals and institutions have signed the
Declaration on Research Assessment (“DORA”).116 In DORA, they argue
for the research community to stop depending on indicators that may
incorporate structural biases,117 such as racism and sexism. They seek
to improve the approaches for assessing research outcomes and
emphasize the importance of evaluating research on its own merits, as
opposed to where the research was published.118 The use of technologyassisted review in the context of law review submissions, which will be
discussed below, is likely to raise similar concerns.
2.

The Current Use of Artificial Intelligence in Law Review
Submissions

In the context of law review submissions, although electronic
submissions platforms have long been the standard,119 the use of
artificial intelligence is still in its infancy. The primary submissions
service, Scholastica, provides technology that “makes reviewing
incoming papers a lot faster.”120 It enables editors to examine and filter
submissions by author, title, date, keywords, or tags.121 Editors have
many options for services that use artificial intelligence technology in
detecting plagiarism and correcting grammar.122 In addition, they can
use tools to confirm that authors have appropriately formatted their
citations.123
Another company, ScholarSift, states it is the “first analytical platform
to deploy machine learning to legal scholarship.”124 Similar to the Patent
Office’s use of machine learning to identify prior art related to a given
patent application, ScholarSift offers technology to search for relevant
literature, as well as assess the possible preemption of a submission.125
Editors and authors can use ScholarSift to confirm that the author did
116 Signers, THE DECLARATION ON RSCH. ASSESSMENT (DORA), https://sfdora.org/signers
(last visited Feb. 4, 2022) [https://perma.cc/5DGA-CC5C].
117 The
Declaration, THE DECLARATION ON RSCH. ASSESSMENT (DORA),
https://sfdora.org/read (last visited Feb. 4, 2022) [https://perma.cc/VTC5-Y3YC].
118 Id.
119 See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 1, at 1301 (“Electronic submission services . . .
have caused submissions to skyrocket.”).
120 Law Review System, supra note 2.
121 Id.
122 See Plagiarism Checker by Grammarly, supra note 12; Turnitin AI, supra note 12.
123 See Online Citation Generators, supra note 13.
124 About Us, SCHOLARSIFT, https://www.scholarsift.com/about (last visited Dec. 21,
2021) [https://perma.cc/YZ6L-PAM3].
125 Home, supra note 12.

368

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 56:347

not overlook articles relevant to a given submission.126 The technology
compares the text and footnotes in an uploaded paper to a large
database of published law journal articles to evaluate similarities,
identifying related scholarship and citations that may be pertinent.127 In
future development, ScholarSift claims to be designing technology to
filter thousands of submissions to locate the “most promising”
papers.128 It has not disclosed, however, the criteria that its proprietary
system will use in determining whether a given submission is
“promising.”129 The filtering mechanism does not appear to be available
for purchase at the present time.
Relatedly, JSTOR is a non-profit organization that offers a teaching
and research platform.130 It is in the process of developing a somewhat
similar technology to the ScholarSift product called the Text
Analyzer.131 As with ScholarSift, users upload a draft, and the tool
identifies related materials.132 Text Analyzer also suggests keywords
that authors can use in posting their papers to an online repository.133
Analogous services exist for practitioners and judges to analyze briefs
and other legal materials.134
126 See Robert Anderson on Analytics for Law Review Submissions and Publishing, IPSE
DIXIT, at 5:50-6:23 (Feb. 16, 2021), https://shows.acast.com/ipse-dixit/episodes/robertanderson-on-analytics-for-law-review-submissions-and- [https://perma.cc/UJR2-FDJF]
(stating that ScholarSift can make sure that authors can “find relevant literature” for an
uploaded paper and “don’t miss anything”).
127 Home, supra note 12; see also Bonnie Shucha, Representing Law Faculty Scholarly
Impact: Strategies for Improving Citation Metrics Accuracy and Promoting Scholarly
Visibility, 40 LEGAL REFERENCE SERVS. Q. 81, 103 (2021) (“At present, ScholarSift
primarily contains freely available articles drawn from Law Review Commons and
supplemented by journal websites.”); Brian Frye, It’s the End of Citation as We Know It
& I Feel Fine, TECHDIRT (Mar. 22, 2021, 3:49 PM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/
20210318/22393446451/end-citation-as-we-know-it-i-feel-fine.shtml [https://perma.cc/
VJ7R-DZT4] (explaining that “ScholarSift tells authors which articles they should be
citing”).
128 Home, supra note 12.
129 Email from ScholarSift to author (Mar. 5, 2021, 12:09 PM) (on file with author)
(recognizing that ScholarSift will “need to explain aspects of how it works in order to
gain confidence from users”); Robert Anderson on Analytics for Law Review Submissions
and Publishing, supra note 126.
130 About JSTOR, JSTOR, https://about.jstor.org (last visited Oct. 3, 2022)
[https://perma.cc/LDY9-V93A].
131 See Text Analyzer: About, supra note 16.
132 Id.
133 Id.; see also Shucha, supra note 127, at 107.
134 See, e.g., CASETEXT, https://casetext.com/cara-ai (last visited May 11, 2022)
[https://perma.cc/PG9X-MB7Y] (“Upload a document from your case to CARA A.I. to find
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In summary, editors can use the technological tools described above
for identifying failure to comply with formatting requirements,
detecting plagiarism, assessing readability, ascertaining missing
references, and checking for preemption. The next Part describes
anticipated advances in technology-assisted review of law review
submissions as well as the potential for harm associated with these
developments.
II.

THE PROMISE AND PERILS OF USING TECHNOLOGY-ASSISTED
REVIEW IN THE LAW REVIEW SUBMISSIONS PROCESS

Editors may soon be able to use technology-assisted review to help
screen law review submissions.135 The usefulness, accuracy, and
reliability of artificial intelligence in this context will depend on the
circumstances in which it is implemented. Technology could partially
automate some aspects of the existing selection process, including its
potential for harm, or it could serve as a mechanism for evaluating and
mitigating bias. A partially automated system might attempt to
reproduce the existing submissions system if developers train it using
articles published by a comprehensive set of law reviews.136
Alternatively, developers might provide examples of articles published
in law reviews that rank above a specific threshold, or articles that have
been highly-cited or downloaded.137 In a less realistic scenario,
developers might enlist a group of scholars to classify the strength of
articles in the training set.138 These different approaches will be
discussed in greater detail below.139
This Part sets forth some of the benefits of technology-assisted review
of submissions, including the potential to address shortcomings in the
current screening process and allow for greater anonymized review. It
then details the potential harms associated with the anticipated use of
artificial intelligence to help screen submissions, including the risks of

authorities with the same legal issues, facts, and jurisdiction . . . .”); LEXIS BRIEF ANALYSIS,
https://plus.lexis.com/briefAnalysis (last visited May 11, 2022) [https://perma.cc/U4CFZ4GN] (“Upload documents from both sides to see citations in common and omitted
authority.”); WESTLAW EDGE QUICK CHECK, https://1.next.westlaw.com/QuickCheck (last
visited May 11, 2022) [https://perma.cc/2NW8-ZP9Z] (“Review the most relevant authority
. . . . Discover issues with the citations and quotations relied upon by the parties.”).
135 See Home, supra note 12; Law Review System, supra note 2.
136 See infra Part II.B.2.
137 See infra Part II.B.2.
138 See infra Part II.B.2.
139 See infra Part II.B.2.
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enabling efficient implementation of existing bias and misplaced
deference to scores assigned by algorithms.
A. Technology Can Mitigate or Perpetuate Existing Bias in Screening
Editors attempt to manage an overwhelming onslaught of
submissions through a variety of screening mechanisms. Despite the
importance of placement to an author’s professional opportunities, law
reviews tend not to publish their decision-making metrics and rarely
disclose how they decide which submissions to accept or reject.140 In
response to surveys, however, editors have indicated factors they often
consider. Some of these current practices reflect practical
considerations that are unlikely to cause harm,141 while others may
result in discriminatory effects.142 Artificial intelligence could partially
automate consideration of many technical factors with minimal risk,143
assigning a score to a given submission to indicate whether it would be
likely to benefit from further review. Technology-assisted review can
also facilitate anonymized review and ameliorate structural
inefficiencies in the current submissions process.144
1.

Evaluating Considerations that Are Unlikely to Cause Harm

Overworked editors need mechanisms to reduce the volume of
submissions that require further examination. Some of the factors that
editors assess in article selection reflect practical considerations. They
are cognizant that certain pieces will require more time and effort to
prepare for publication.145 For example, they consider whether a
submission complies with formatting requirements and the
completeness of citations.146 Other factors they assess include the ratio
of text to footnotes, the number of footnotes, and the density of

140 See Noah C. Chauvin, The Banality of Law Journal Rejections, 106 MINN. L. REV.
HEADNOTES 18, 22 (2021) (observing that many journals use “template rejection notes
and send essentially identical messages”).
141 See infra Part II.A.1.
142 See infra Part II.A.2.
143 See Checco et al., supra note 40, at 4.
144 See infra Part II.A.3-4.
145 See Jason P. Nance & Dylan J. Steinberg, The Law Review Article Selection Process:
Results from a National Study, 71 ALB. L. REV. 565, 586 (2008) (stating that “Articles
Editors also have an eye on the difficulty of preparing an article for publication”).
146 See id. at 613 (finding that a submission “that fails to conform to a journal’s
stylistic requirements is significantly less likely to receive an offer of publication”).
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footnotes.147 Editors sometimes also examine the length of an article as
a signal of quality.148 Considering these types of factors is unlikely to
result in discriminatory effects for most authors, though they may not
be sound indications of quality for a given submission.149 Still, authors
without the ability to hire research assistants or other institutional
support may be at a disadvantage in meeting some of these types of
formalistic requirements, such as the completeness and formatting of
footnotes.150
More substantive considerations include the timeliness of a piece, the
importance of the topic, and the quality of writing and research.151 For
example, editors sometimes choose to publish articles in popular topic
areas, rather than submissions that make significant contributions in
narrow topics like tax law.152 In assessing the quality of the research and
writing in a submission, editors likely consider the inclusion of seminal
cases, statutes, or terms of art in discussing specific areas of law.153 They
also attempt to evaluate the contribution of the paper to the literature
more broadly.154

147 See Arthur D. Austin, Footnotes as Product Differentiation, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1131,
1141-44 (1987) (describing the “density factor” and “numbers game”); Posner, supra
note 4, at 1134; Break Into Tax, Optimizing Law Review Submissions, YOUTUBE (Jan. 31,
2022), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TZ6_eLecqQA&t=641s [https://perma.cc/664GXNR9] (discussing the text-to-footnote ratio in an interview with former and current
law review editors).
148 See Lindgren, supra note 4, at 531 (“The extraordinary length of most legal
articles is a reflection of the need to impress students.”); Posner, supra note 4, at 1134.
149 See Nance & Steinberg, supra note 145, at 570 n.28.
150 See id.; see also Meera E. Deo, Investigating Pandemic Effects on Legal Academia,
89 FORDHAM L. REV. 2467, 2469-71 (2021) (describing the effects of the pandemic on
female authors’ scholarly productivity).
151 See Christensen & Oseid, supra note 1, at 180 (observing “study participants
almost unanimously agreed that they were influenced by the topic of an article”); Nance
& Steinberg, supra note 145, at 587 (noting that “while it would appear that a small
percentage of Articles Editors actively seek out trendy topics, most do not, and some
assiduously avoid them”).
152 Break Into Tax, supra note 147; see Christensen & Oseid, supra note 1, at 196
(“Among the Top 15 segment, there was a general consensus that . . . narrow topics
such as tax, civil procedure, and admiralty usually do not get published.”); Nance &
Steinberg, supra note 145, at 585 (describing how editors tend “to gravitate towards . . .
articles in certain subject areas . . . as the result of a rational desire to increase the
prestige of their own publications”).
153 See Christensen & Oseid, supra note 1, at 201.
154 See id. at 201-03; Lindgren, supra note 4, at 527 (describing how student editors
sometimes evaluate submissions despite a limited knowledge of the scholarly
literature).
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A system that partially automates examination of superficial
considerations amenable to technological implementation could save
editors a significant amount of time and effort.155 Evaluating whether a
submission respects formatting requirements, such as maximum word
count, would be a standard application of technology that would appear
to be unlikely to result in harm to most authors. Authors who lack
institutional support or mentoring, however, may face greater
challenges in meeting some of these requirements.156 Law reviews, or a
submissions service such as Scholastica, should offer a standardized
template to authors to minimize any potential disadvantage to authors
who are unaware of standard formatting.157 At some point, a machine
learning system eventually might be able to assess whether some of the
formalistic aspects of a submission, such as the text-to-footnote ratio,
actually correlate with features of articles that are published or highlycited.158 Papers may change significantly, however, between the time
they are submitted and published.159
A partially automated system could assign a score that weights the
stylistic and formatting attributes of a submission. In the context of
scientific journals, similar systems have been able to predict peer review
scores based on formatting, how often words were used (textual
content), and the complexity of vocabulary, size of words, and the
length of sentences (readability).160 However, the ability to predict peer
review results through such a topical evaluation may suggest bias exists
in the peer review process.161 As with its use in screening submissions
to scientific journals, a partially automated system may not accurately
assign a score to submissions in nascent areas of law or those that use
unique and worthwhile writing styles.162
155

See Checco et al., supra note 40, at 4.
See Deo, supra note 150, at 2469-71; Nance & Steinberg, supra note 145, at 570 n.28.
157 See EUGENE VOLOKH, ACADEMIC LEGAL WRITING: LAW REVIEW ARTICLES, STUDENT
NOTES, SEMINAR PAPERS, AND GETTING ON LAW REVIEW 290 (5th ed. 2016) (providing a
link to a template for formatting the submission); Checco et al., supra note 40, at 4
(describing “first-impression bias” in document assessment).
158 See Berman, supra note 57, at 1279; see also infra Part III.B (describing how
complete transparency about feature selection could result in strategic gaming by
authors).
159 See Friedman, supra note 1, at 1317 (explaining that sometimes articles are edited
and rewritten after acceptance for publication).
160 Checco et al., supra note 40, at 9-10.
161 Id.
162 Id.; see also Clements, supra note 31, at 4-6; Su Lin Blodgett & Brendan O’Connor,
Racial Disparity in Natural Language Processing: A Case Study of Social Media African156
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Although an algorithm’s assignment of a score might appear overly
objective and therefore result in too much deference by law review
editors,163 the score could provide a mechanism for evaluating bias in
the current screening process.164 Biases can exist in any decision maker,
whether human or algorithmic.165 Unlike with human editors, biases in
algorithms may be encoded for later examination. It is sometimes
possible to “‘peer into the brain’ of an algorithm”166 and attempt to
mitigate any adverse effects. Similar technology has been used in
auditing employment algorithms for discrimination as well as in
monitoring hiring discrimination by recruiters using online
platforms.167 For instance, if a law review editor might have passed on
a submission based on dubious heuristics, a high score assigned by a
machine learning algorithm might suggest implicit bias is affecting the
editor’s decision-making.168 Editors could also examine how different
article assignment, review, and selection approaches — for example,
requiring consensus — may exacerbate or mitigate biases.
A human editor using technology-assisted review might also be able
to ascertain whether a submission in a given area of law contains the
most relevant citations with greater accuracy than an editor acting
alone, considering the editor’s limited scope of knowledge in a great
number of different fields of law.169 To discern whether relevant
materials have been overlooked, a machine learning system would

American English (June 30, 2017), in FAIRNESS, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND TRANSPARENCY IN
MACHINE LEARNING WORKSHOP AT KDD, Aug. 2017, at 1, 1 (describing how “current
systems sometimes analyze the language of females and minorities more poorly than
they do of whites and males”).
163 See Heaven, supra note 32, at 610; cf. Angwin et al., supra note 112 (highlighting
how judges have cited “risk scores” generated by algorithms “in their sentencing
decisions”).
164 See generally Cofone, supra note 55, at 1411 (discussing how “algorithms can be
productive for reducing discrimination”).
165 See Volokh, supra note 11, at 1140 (arguing the use of artificial intelligence
“doesn’t need to be perfect” because humans are not perfect).
166 Kroll et al., supra note 18, at 634; see Cofone, supra note 55, at 1411.
167 See Hangartner et al., supra note 18, at 573 (finding that contact rates by
recruiters using an online platform were lower for individuals from minority groups
than for members of majority groups); Alex Engler, Auditing Employment Algorithms for
Discrimination, BROOKINGS (Mar. 12, 2021), https://www.brookings.edu/research/
auditing-employment-algorithms-for-discrimination [https://perma.cc/3RMX-6W8W].
168 See Kleinberg et al., supra note 20, at 30098-100.
169 Artificial intelligence technology might be especially useful for evaluating
interdisciplinary submissions. See Wise et al., supra note 8, at 11 (noting that
consideration of “interdisciplinary articles requires both legal expertise and expertise in
another discipline”).
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require a large corpus of documents to engage in related-articles
analysis.170 By comparing a submission to related articles that use
similar terminology, machine learning technology can ascertain when
important cases, books, or articles might have been missed.171 For
example, a partially automated system might indicate that a submission
discussing abortion failed to mention Roe v. Wade.172 Not only would
such technology ensure the most prominent work has been cited, it also
could raise the voices of marginalized authors whose work has been
overlooked historically.173
A machine learning algorithm might be used to assign a lower score
to articles that failed to cite relevant materials, though this practice
could result in harm. For example, a scoring mechanism could help
editors evaluate the likely completeness of research in a submission.
However, authors with institutional access to the related-articles
technology would have an advantage as compared with authors lacking
such access.174 Moreover, perhaps the widespread adoption of such a
system might “make citations pointless” because readers could also use
the related-articles technology to identify sources that are relevant to a
given publication.175
170 See Lehr & Ohm, supra note 14, at 678 (“To reap the predictive benefits of
machine learning, a sufficiently large number of observations is required.”); Ron
Snyder, Under the Hood of Text Analyzer, JSTOR LABS (Mar. 7, 2017),
https://labs.jstor.org/blog/under-the-hood-of-text-analyzer-2 [https://perma.cc/5U5E4DKF] (describing the technical aspects of how the Text Analyzer tool processes
uploaded text, identifies the main topics and entities in it, and then suggests similar
documents in the JSTOR database).
171 See Home, supra note 12 (offering a machine learning system that will “search for
most on-point literature” automatically); Text Analyzer: About, supra note 16 (“The tool
analyzes the text within the document to find key topics and terms used, and then uses
the ones it deems most important — the ‘prioritized terms’ — to find similar content in
JSTOR.”).
172 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
173 See Robert Anderson on Analytics for Law Review Submissions and Publishing, supra
note 126, at 17:00-19:07 (describing how ScholarSift has the potential to increase
citation counts for people of color and women); Frye, supra note 127 (“Unlike other
kinds of machine learning programs, which seem almost designed to reinforce
unfortunate prejudices, ScholarSift seems to do the opposite, highlighting authors who
might otherwise be overlooked.”).
174 See generally Bale, supra note 1, at 48 (discussing the importance of institutional
support in the submissions process); Kroll et al., supra note 18, at 657-60 (describing
how systems can be strategically gamed).
175 Frye, supra note 127 (arguing that if the main reason for citation “is to identify
relevant sources that readers will find helpful,” perhaps “legal scholarship could adopt
a new norm in which authors only cite works a computer wouldn’t flag as relevant”).
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For the foreseeable future, a partially automated system will not be
able to assign a score to a submission based on substantive
considerations (such as novelty), other than perhaps completeness of
research.176 Artificial intelligence cannot engage in the deep, substantive
analysis that is the most time-consuming aspect of submission
evaluation. Nevertheless, streamlining the most straightforward
elements of review would provide editors additional time to engage in
more extensive examination for a greater number of submissions and
serve as a feedback mechanism for editors’ selection decisions.
2.

Avoiding Considerations Likely to Result in Adverse Outcomes

Overwhelmed editors sometimes rely on factors that can result in
adverse outcomes, even though any harmful effects are unintentional.
For example, they may consider the reputation of the law school an
author attended or the author’s current affiliation in determining
whether to review an article or make an offer of publication.177 Some
commentators have explained that the inclusion of these features can
result in discrimination against minority and female applicants, even
though it provides little insight into the quality of a given submission.178
They describe how bias against non-elite schools begins during the
faculty recruitment and hiring process, affecting diversity at highlyranked schools.179 Individuals may attend or be affiliated with lessprestigious schools for reasons that correlate with race, ethnicity,

176 See Checco et al., supra note 40, at 8 tbl.5 (showcasing the potential role of AI in
different aspects of the peer review process); infra Part III.C for a discussion of potential
future applications.
177 See Christensen & Oseid, supra note 1, at 188-91 (concluding that “law review
editors, particularly those at higher ranked schools, are heavily influenced by author
credentials”); Friedman, supra note 1, at 1315-16; Lindgren, supra note 4, at 530; Nance
& Steinberg, supra note 145, at 584 (stating that a survey indicated that “editors use
author credentials extensively to determine which articles to publish”); Wise et al.,
supra note 8, at 40 (noting that “two of the major criticisms of law reviews’ selection
practices are that law reviews frequently select articles on the basis of the author’s
credentials and law school affiliation rather than on article quality”).
178 See DEO, supra note 5, at 18; Barocas & Selbst, supra note 26, at 689; Minna J.
Kotkin, Of Authorship and Audacity: An Empirical Study of Gender Disparity and Privilege
in the ‘Top Ten’ Law Reviews, 31 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 385, 389 (2010) (“[I]t may be that
the best scholars are at the best law schools, but an effort should be made to ensure that
unwarranted privilege is not at work.”); Keerthana Nunna, W. Nicholson Price II &
Jonathan Tietz, Hierarchy, Race & Gender in Legal Scholarly Networks, 75 STAN. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2023) (noting that “race/gender demographics vary with school rank”).
179 See DEO, supra note 5, at 13.
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religion, and gender — such as financial concerns, family obligations,
or cultural preferences — notwithstanding similar abilities.180
Student editors may feel undue pressure from professors at their law
school to agree to publish a particular submission, which may be their
professor’s own work.181 Some law reviews appear to reserve a
significant amount of space in their journals for in-house authors.182
When internal authors receive priority based on their position, it
prevents the publication of another submission, harming not only
outside authors but also the law review itself.183 Evidence suggests that
when law reviews publish articles by internal faculty, those in-house
articles receive fewer citations than articles published by outside
authors.184 Thus, law reviews may act against their own best interest in
publishing articles by internal faculty, although there may be other
reasons for publishing in-house articles including reputational benefits
and improved relationships within the institution.185 Favoring in-house
authors also “likely has a crowding out effect” against external authors
whose articles may end up being published in lower-ranked journals
and may be cited less frequently than they should as a consequence.186
As another example, editors sometimes consider whether the author
previously published in highly-ranked journals.187 Placement history is
an imperfect indication of submission quality for several reasons.
Because many law reviews do not offer blind submission, the potential
for “insider bias” and consideration of the author’s institutional
180 See id. at 14 (describing how women and people of color do not have the financial
or social support needed to move multiple times to advance their careers); GRADUATE
SCH. OF EDUC., HARV. UNIV., 2017 YEAR IN REVIEW: THE COLLABORATIVE ON ACADEMIC
CAREERS IN HIGHER EDUCATION 6 (2017), https://coache.gse.harvard.edu/files/gsecoache/files/coache_annual_report_2017 [https://perma.cc/CQA8-FMUL] (finding that
potential opportunities for significant others may be more important considerations in
employment decisions than salary).
181 See Adam Chilton, Justin Driver, Jonathan S. Masur & Kyle Rozema, Assessing
Affirmative Action’s Diversity Rationale, 122 COLUM. L. REV. 331, 390-91 (2022);
Thomson, supra note 3, at 223-24 (providing statistics on the disproportionality of
authors published by the journals of their home institutions).
182 See Thomson, supra note 3, at 223; Yoon, supra note 3, at 310.
183 See Yoon, supra note 3, at 335.
184 See id. at 310, 336 (concluding that “this form of protectionism creates a
deadweight loss in legal scholarship”); Chilton et al., supra note 181, at 390-91.
185 See Yoon, supra note 3, at 310.
186 Id. at 335.
187 See Christensen & Oseid, supra note 1, at 180 (noting that “editors at higher
tiered law schools were highly influenced by where an author has previously
published”).
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affiliation can taint the placement process.188 The placement process is
not independent of partiality, as “disproportionate influence constructs
our very notions of what good quality scholarship is.”189 Although past
placement may provide some signal of the quality of a previous piece,
past performance may not be indicative of current submission quality.
In other words, previous article quality is no guarantee of the quality of
a new submission.190 In the scientific realm, researchers and institutions
have criticized overreliance on indicators, such as journal impact
factors, in assessing the quality of research.191 They argue for improving
the mechanisms for evaluation and stress the importance of considering
research on its merits.192
Most troubling, some scholars have described how an author’s gender
or race may affect placement of prior work in highly-ranked law
reviews.193 Bias may influence which research is considered valuable
and accepted for publication, even when it is unintentional.194 With
regard to the effects of gender, one empirical study in the area of legal
studies demonstrated “significant gender disparity in publication” at the
top ten law reviews.195 Although the study analyzes many potential
reasons for the discrepancy, it does not offer a conclusion as to why it
188 Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Andrew P. Moriss & William D. Henderson, Enduring
Hierarchies in American Legal Education, 89 IND. L.J. 941, 1010 (2014); see
Lawprofblawg & Darren Bush, Law Reviews, Citation Counts, and Twitter (Oh My!):
Behind the Curtains of the Law Professor’s Search for Meaning, 50 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 327,
364 (2018).
189 J. M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, How to Win Cites and Influence People, 71 CHI.KENT L. REV. 843, 844 (1996) (explaining that “our notions of quality are not fully
separable from notions of influence, [but] not because influence necessarily follows
quality as its just reward”).
190 Cf. Lawrence Carrel, Study Proves Past Results Don’t Predict Future Results, FORBES
(Feb. 15, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/lcarrel/2020/02/15/study-proves-pastresults-dont-predict-future-results [https://perma.cc/7HXJ-SWNE] (“Past results are no
guarantee of future performance.”).
191 See Sugimoto, supra note 110, at 31; The Declaration, supra note 117.
192 See Sugimoto, supra note 110, at 31.
193 See Amy DeVaudreuil, Silence at the California Law Review, 91 CALIF. L. REV.
1183, 1187 (2003); Higdon, supra note 1, at 348-49; Kotkin, supra note 178, at 386;
Leong, supra note 5, at 373 (finding “only 32% of law review articles are by women, and
the disparity is even more significant at the ‘most prestigious’ law reviews, with women
publishing 20.4% of articles in those venues”).
194 Victor Ray, The Racial Politics of Citation, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Apr. 27, 2018),
https://www.insidehighered.com/advice/2018/04/27/racial-exclusions-scholarly-citationsopinion [https://perma.cc/3DFT-FQSB] (“Intentionally or not, strong evidence shows
that bias can inform the types of research that is considered valid and worthy of
citation.”).
195 Kotkin, supra note 178, at 386.
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exists.196 As for the effects of race on placement, one article found that
almost seventy percent of articles published in the top ten law reviews
in 2017 were written by authors who had graduated from the top five
law schools.197 People of color comprise a smaller proportion of
graduates from top law schools, so consideration of the author’s
educational affiliation in screening submissions may result in
discriminatory effects.198 Status as a law professor can also affect
placement in a way that causes harm to marginalized groups.199 The
available data indicates that approximately twenty-four percent of law
professors are white women, eight percent are men of color, and seven
percent are women of color.200
Until very recently, the composition of student editors at many top
law reviews has tended to be fairly homogenous in terms of racial and
ethnic background.201 Some commentators have described how the lack
of diversity in law review membership may affect article selection; they
believe that “diverse groups of students bring different ideas about the
nature of quality legal scholarship to the table.”202 Many journals have
been making efforts to increase diversity among their membership.203
Such changes are not without controversy; challenges to the diversity
196

Id.
Lawprofblawg & Bush, supra note 188, at 336.
198 See id. at 336-37; Heald, supra note 8, at 3 (explaining that “57% of all law
professors come from Harvard, Yale, Stanford, Columbia, or UChicago, and . . . 95% of
all professors at the top ten schools graduated from a top ten institution”).
199 See Heald, supra note 8, at 3.
200 Deo, supra note 150, at 2471.
201 See STEPHANIE CHICHETTI, EMILY J. FREEBORN & LILIA VOLYNKOVA, N.Y. L. SCH. L.
2011-2012 LAW REVIEW DIVERSITY REPORT
3
fig.1
(2012),
REV.,
https://silo.tips/download/law-review-diversity-report-5 [https://perma.cc/4GT2-HCJH]
(finding that 15% of editors-in-chief of the top 50 law reviews identified as a person of
color and 29% identified as female); DeVaudreuil, supra note 193, at 1186 (describing
the consequences of having “few underrepresented students of color” on the California
Law Review and how the journal “might begin to address the problem of the lack of
diversity in its membership”); Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Legal Scholars Revisited,
88 U. CHI. L. REV. 1595, 1609-10 (2021) [hereinafter Most-Cited Revisited] (noting all
the editors-in-chief at the sixteen highest-ranked law schools are female).
202 DeVaudreuil, supra note 193, at 1187.
203 See, e.g., Diversity, CALIF. L. REV., https://www.californialawreview.org/about/
diversity (last visited July 9, 2022) [https://perma.cc/6S7J-R8QV] (describing the
California Law Review’s diversity initiatives); Writing Competition, HARV. L. REV.,
https://harvardlawreview.org/writing-competition (last visited Feb. 11, 2022)
[https://perma.cc/89NV-3MS7] (describing how applicants may choose to include
“aspects of their identity available through the Law Review’s holistic consideration
process”).
197
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policies at the Harvard Law Review and the New York University Law
Review have been raised, although unsuccessfully.204
The changing leadership at law reviews may influence the
submissions that the journal selects for publication.205 Shifts in diversity
may affect group decision-making in some situations.206 For example,
one study found that companies having the greatest number of women
on their boards earned a higher return on investment compared with
those having the smallest number of women on their boards, though
some maintain that other factors are responsible for the positive
outcomes.207 Scholars have argued that the group process of selecting
law review submissions may benefit from diverse viewpoints.208 One
study found that law reviews that implemented diversity policies had
“median citations to their volumes increase by roughly 23% in the
ensuing five years.”209
An artificial intelligence system should avoid replicating biases in the
current submissions system. An algorithm that considers information
about the law school the author attended, placement of the author’s
prior articles in highly-ranked journals, or the author’s institutional
204 Fac., Alumni, & Students Opposed to Racial Preferences v. N.Y. Univ. L. Rev.,
No. 18 Civ. 9184 (ER), 2020 WL 1529311, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2020), aff’d sub
nom. Fac. v. N.Y. Univ., 11 F.4th 68 (2d Cir. 2021); Fac., Alumni, & Students Opposed
to Racial Preferences v. Harvard L. Rev., No. CV 18-12105, 2019 WL 3754023 (D. Mass.
Aug. 8, 2019).
205 See Karen Sloan, ‘A More Diverse Conversation’: Why It Matters that More Law
Journals Are Electing Black Editors, LAW.COM (Mar. 24, 2021, 2:56 PM),
https://www.law.com/2021/03/24/a-more-diverse-conversation-why-it-matters-that-morelaw-journals-are-electing-black-editors [https://perma.cc/6X6R-HCSB] (“The diversification
of the editor-in-chief ranks may also prompt a shift in the articles and authors who get
published in those journals . . . editors from diverse backgrounds are more likely to
recognize the value of different perspectives and approaches within legal scholarship.”);
Chilton et al., supra note 181, at 398 (explaining that “different members of the group
are able to contribute different viewpoints to the collective process” of selecting
submissions for publication).
206 See Chilton et al., supra note 181, at 360-61 (describing studies that demonstrate
the impact of diversity in decision-making by juries).
207 Why Diversity and Inclusion Matter: Financial Performance (Appendix), CATALYST
(June 24, 2020), https://www.catalyst.org/research/why-diversity-and-inclusionmatter-financial-performance [https://perma.cc/262Z-SR5Y]. But see Kim Elsesser,
What to Expect from the Influx of Women on California’s Corporate Boards, FORBES (May
21, 2021, 3:49 PM EDT), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kimelsesser/2021/05/21/what-toexpect-from-the-influx-of-women-on-californias-corporate-boards [https://perma.cc/8QQ7LRPE] (“[T]he association between higher profits and female board members is likely
due to . . . another factor like more innovative leadership strategies that positively
impact both the selection of female board members and corporate profits.”).
208 See Chilton et al., supra note 181, at 398.
209 Id. at 331.
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affiliation may perpetuate discriminatory outcomes. The potential for
harm from considering such information argues against its inclusion in
a technology-assisted review system, even if it might appear to be
helpful in evaluating submissions. The risks of bias in implementing a
partially automated screening system, including the importance of
careful feature selection and the potential for proxy discrimination, will
be described in further detail below.210
3.

Increasing the Feasibility of Anonymous Review

Anonymous review may help mitigate some of the bias that currently
taints the submissions process.211 Scholars have advocated for blind
review in the submissions process,212 but its feasibility for some law
reviews has been limited by the number of submissions received each
cycle.213 Although many have argued for limiting simultaneous
submissions, adopting peer review, or requiring acceptance of first
offers as a way to increase the feasibility of anonymous review, these
proposals have not been adopted.214 Law review editors might be able
to use technology-assisted review to help streamline consideration for
some papers, freeing up time for anonymous review of a greater number
of submissions.
By analogy, consider the effects of blinded auditions in the hiring of
musicians in orchestras.215 Before 1970, orchestras were essentially
homogenous — most orchestra musicians were male students of a

210

See infra Part II.B.3-4.
See Higdon, supra note 1, at 344-49 (discussing various factors, including the
author’s race and gender, which can affect the selection process in non-anonymous
review); Thomson, supra note 3, at 210 (“Legal academics generally favor a system of
blind review in article selection, i.e., that the article selection process is ‘blind’ as to the
identity of the author and in the institution(s) with which the author is affiliated.”).
212 See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 1, at 1351-52 (proposing limits on the number of
simultaneous submissions); Wise et al., supra note 8, at 72-73 (arguing in favor of blind
peer review); see also Heald, supra note 8, at 1-3 (describing the benefits of anonymous
peer review).
213 See Christensen & Oseid, supra note 1, at 203-05 (describing challenges in
managing the high volume of submissions).
214 See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 1, at 1352 (recognizing these proposals would be
a “huge change to the culture” of law review submissions); Wise et al., supra note 8, at
73-74 (describing the process of article selection by adopting peer review as an
“experiment”).
215 See Claudia Goldin & Cecilia Rouse, Orchestrating Impartiality: The Impact of
“Blind” Auditions on Female Musicians, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 715, 716 (2000).
211
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“select group of teachers.”216 When curtains were used to obscure the
identity of a musician during auditions, such that the evaluators could
hear but not see the musician, the likelihood that a female musician
would be selected increased by twenty-five percent, according to one
study.217
Similarly, facilitating anonymous evaluation of law review
submissions would allow editors to impartially assess more papers,
ensuring that worthy ideas would be recognized, regardless of an
individual’s status, affiliation, background, or identity.218 To ensure
objectivity throughout the submission process, any identifying
information would need to remain anonymous until after a final
decision had been reached.219 Alternatively, some scholars have
proposed that such information should be considered at some point in
the selection process as a way to address systemic inequity or promote
diversity.220
4.

Addressing Structural Inefficiencies

The current system’s reliance on students to filter through thousands
of submissions each cycle is not merely inefficient,221 it is unfair to both
students and authors. Students devote numerous, unpaid hours for
work that is sometimes tedious. However, they do receive many benefits
216

Id. at 715-16.
Id. at 736. But see Anthony Tommasini, To Make Orchestras More Diverse, End
Blind Auditions, N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/16/
arts/music/blind-auditions-orchestras-race.html [https://perma.cc/2FHQ-3JHH] (arguing
that orchestras should “take race and gender into account, along with the full spectrum
of a musician’s experience”).
218 Wise et al., supra note 8, at 72.
219 See Thomson, supra note 3, at 226, 262 (“[I]t must be asked why the review
process is blind only until the Committee’s final vote and not fully blind.”); Article
Submissions, STAN. L. REV., https://www.stanfordlawreview.org/submissions/articlesubmissions (last visited Jan. 2, 2022) [https://perma.cc/8ERP-WJFU] (“[O]ur review
process is fully blind until the Committee’s final vote.”); How WLR Is Cultivating a BiasConscious Editorial Culture Since Implementing Blind Article Selection, SCHOLASTICA (Aug.
28, 2020), https://blog.scholasticahq.com/post/wlr-implementing-blind-article-selection
[https://perma.cc/HP8Z-XL56] (describing how the Washington Law Review “follows a
‘partial double-blind’ review process wherein author and editor identities are kept
anonymous during its first two rounds of article review”).
220 See Tommasini, supra note 217. See generally Friedman, supra note 1, at 1316
(describing how editors may “favor groups they worry are excluded otherwise from the
publishing process, be it junior scholars, or scholars of color, or any other group they
deem important”).
221 See Bale, supra note 1, at 48; Christensen & Oseid, supra note 1, at 203-05;
Friedman, supra note 1, at 1306-07; Higdon, supra note 1, at 341.
217
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in return for their efforts: the ability to influence legal scholarship
through selection and editing of articles, engagement with legal
scholars, educational and research opportunities, academic credit, and
potentially increased employment prospects.222 Technology-assisted
review could reduce the burden on students who screen through
volumes of submissions. In the current system, some higher ranked law
reviews rely on lower ranked law reviews to conduct the initial
screening of submissions.223 Elite journals might evaluate a submission
in light of an expedite request based on a lower ranked journal’s offer,
which effectively provides a signal of quality.224 Thus, the work of lower
ranked journals is sometimes lost through the unfairness of the expedite
process.225
Technology-assisted review would provide the greatest benefit for the
journals engaged in the most intensive screening. Artificial intelligence
is best used to highlight clearly deficient submissions.226 Given the large
number of law schools with general and specialty journals,227 some
journals will have a smaller number of submissions to review. Journals
with more relaxed submissions standards228 may not have as great of a
need for technology-assisted review, while journals with a high volume
of submissions to review will likely obtain a greater benefit from
222 Wise et al., supra note 8, at 4, 24-25 (“Law review editors select and edit articles;
engage in legal analysis, research, and writing; interact with legal scholars; and manage
an important legal enterprise.”); see Friedman, supra note 1, at 1333-34 (detailing the
costs and benefits of “free student labor”).
223 Miller, supra note 42, at 214.
224 Id.
225 See id. at 214-15; Heald, supra note 8, at 2 (concluding the expedite process
“wastes limited reviewing resources, chokes an already overwhelmed system, and
creates genuine moral hazard”).
226 See Surden, Machine Learning, supra note 11, at 101-02 (describing how “the
algorithms may be able to reliably filter out large swathes of documents that are likely
to be irrelevant so that the attorney does not have to waste limited cognitive resources
analyzing them”).
227 See Raizel Liebler, Information for Submitting to the Top Specialty Law Journals
(Jan. 2020) (unpublished manuscript) (available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3387635) (providing a list of the top specialty journals);
Rostron & Levit, supra note 8 (indicating that there are 196 general law reviews); W&L
Law Journal Rankings, WASH. & LEE SCH. OF L., https://managementtools4.wlu.edu/
LawJournals (last updated July 15, 2022) [https://perma.cc/R3GD-XCHV] (ranking the
top 400 published law journals in the United States).
228 See Friedman, supra note 1, at 1329 (noting that “one charm of the current system
is that every article finds a home”); Heald, supra note 8, at 1 (explaining that with 654
law journals available, legal academics “never have to worry about getting published.
It’s just a question of where”).
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screening assistance.229 However, if selective journals rely on
technology-assisted review scores to a greater extent than less selective
journals, the potential for harm increases.230
B. The Risks of Implementing Technology-Assisted Review
Using artificial intelligence to assist in reviewing submissions raises
significant concerns. Although relying on partially automated screening
to assess compliance with formatting or word count requirements is
unlikely to cause harm for most authors, using artificial intelligence in
a more substantive manner could result in discriminatory outcomes.231
In their seminal work describing the risks associated with algorithmic
decision-making, Solon Barocas and Andrew Selbst set forth a useful
categorization to describe the ways in which bias may taint machine
learning systems, which will be described in greater detail in the
sections that follow.232 The individuals involved in developing the
machine learning algorithm have biases, which they may
unintentionally incorporate into the technology.233 For example,
developers may specify the goal for the technology to try to match,
known as the “target variable” (such as the “strength” or “weakness” of
a paper), in a way that introduces unfairness.234 They may also select
training data that may not be representative or may reflect systemic
bias.235 For instance, an algorithm might consider features that embed
bias — perhaps awarding lower scores to papers from authors if they
did not graduate from a top three law school.236 Algorithms may rely on
factors that end up being proxies for information about race, gender,
religion, or other protected characteristics of authors.237 In these types
of circumstances, technology-assisted review may perpetuate inequality
in future decision-making.
229 For instance, the Duke Law Journal had an acceptance rate of 1.24% in the spring
of 2021. Bale, supra note 1, at 48.
230 See infra Part II.B.
231 See generally Barocas & Selbst, supra note 26, at 677-93 (discussing multiple ways
in which adverse outcomes may occur during the data mining process).
232 Id.
233 Id. at 677-81.
234 Id. at 678-80.
235 Id. at 680-81.
236 See id. at 689.
237 See generally Anya E.R. Prince & Daniel Schwarcz, Proxy Discrimination in the
Age of Artificial Intelligence and Big Data, 105 IOWA L. REV. 1257, 1266 (2020) (defining
proxy discrimination as “scenarios in which an algorithm uses a variable whose
predictive power derives from its correlation with membership in the suspect class”).
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Difficulty Defining the Target Variable

Decisions made about labeling target variables can introduce bias into
machine learning algorithms.238 Target variables are the “outcomes of
interest” that the technology seeks to match.239 Discrimination can arise
if developers select target variables that give some groups an advantage
over others.240 Barocas and Selbst offer the example of a hiring
algorithm in which employers try to automate the process of finding a
“good” employee.241 Unlike spam detection, which is a clearly defined
binary determination of “spam” or “not spam,” defining what makes a
“good” employee is more subjective. If developers consider prior
assessments from human-evaluated annual reviews in defining a “good”
employee, the definition of the target variable will be subjective and
likely inconsistent.242 Determining a “good” employee might include an
examination of productivity, tenure, or sales, among other factors.243
Discrimination can creep in during the hiring process if, for example,
the algorithm considers overall tenure of employment. Because women
tend to take leave from the workforce at a higher rate than men
historically, a consideration of overall tenure in defining a “good”
employee may result in discriminatory outcomes based on gender.244
In the context of law review submissions, the manner in which the
developers of machine learning technology define the “quality” of an
example in the training data can introduce discrimination. Sometimes,
publication or the placement of a piece can provide an indication of
quality.245 As described previously, however, placement can be an
unreliable signal for quality for many reasons.246 Placement often
reflects insider bias where status, including favoring of in-house faculty,
influences where an article is published.247 The author’s race or gender
238 Bent, supra note 55, at 811 (explaining how “the selection and labeling of the
target variable creates a vulnerability in the machine-learning process that can lead to
the reproduction of human bias”).
239 Barocas & Selbst, supra note 26, at 678.
240 See id. at 679.
241 Id.
242 Id.
243 Id.
244 Kroll et al., supra note 18, at 681 (describing how the consideration of tenure is
“a known proxy for gender in hiring applications”).
245 See Dennis J. Callahan & Neal Devins, Law Review Article Placement: Benefit or
Beauty Prize?, 56 J. LEGAL EDUC. 374, 385 (2006) (finding that “articles in high-tier
reviews continue to be cited more frequently than those published in other tiers”).
246 See supra Part II.A.2.
247 See supra Part II.A.2.
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may also adversely affect the placement of a given piece.248 In particular,
consideration of an author’s educational affiliation and status as a
professor may have a bearing on placement, possibly resulting in
discriminatory effects.249
As an alternative, developers might rely on citation frequency, depth,
or publication downloads to ascertain the quality of an example in the
training data set.250 A training data set that relies on these metrics could
be more inclusive, as some articles from lower ranked journals receive
many more citations than publications from highly-ranked law
reviews.251 Scholars have raised concerns, however, that these
indicators may suffer from bias and gaming risks.252 They also maintain
that it may not be possible to remove the residual influence of
248

See supra Part II.A.2.
See supra Part II.A.2.
250 See Paul J. Heald & Ted M. Sichelman, Ranking the Academic Impact of 100
American Law Schools, 60 JURIMETRICS J. 1, 4 (2019) (recommending consideration of
citation counts and SSRN download statistics in a faculty reputation component for the
U.S. News ranking score for law schools); Gregory Sisk, Nicole Catlin, Alexandra
Anderson & Lauren Gunderson, Scholarly Impact of Law School Faculties in 2021:
Updating the Leiter Score Ranking for the Top Third, 17 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 1041, 1048
(2022) (stating that although “there are multiple ways to evaluate the scholarly work of
individual law professors . . . a citation count measure is a valid and reliable proxy for
scholarly excellence”); Yoon, supra note 3, at 314-15 (concluding that citation count “is
a well-established — and the most objective — measure of quality . . . in legal
scholarship”).
251 See Alfred L. Brophy, The Signaling Value of Law Reviews: An Exploration of
Citations and Prestige, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 229, 236-38 (2009).
252 See, e.g., Bernard S. Black & Paul L. Caron, Ranking Law Schools: Using SSRN to
Measure Scholarly Performance, 81 IND. L.J. 83, 122 (2006) (discussing how the number
of downloads from SSRN is vulnerable to gaming); Gregory Scott Crespi, Judicial and
Law Review Citation Frequencies for Articles Published in Different “Tiers” of Law Journals:
An Empirical Analysis, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 897, 901-02 (2004) (explaining “there
does not appear to be any feasible way to separate out and control for relative author
prestige or article quality”); Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar Revisited: How to
Marginalize Outsider Writing, Ten Years Later, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1349, 1351 (1992)
(concluding at the time, that “mainstream figures who control the terms of discourse
marginalize outsider writing as long as possible”); Brian Leiter, Measuring the Academic
Distinction of Law Faculties, 29 J. LEGAL STUDS. 451, 469 (2000) (“The [cited] work is
neither particularly good nor especially creative or groundbreaking, but it is there and
everyone knows it is there and it must be duly acknowledged.”); Deborah Jones Merritt,
Scholarly Influence in a Diverse Legal Academy: Race, Sex, and Citation Counts, 29 J. LEGAL
STUDS. 345, 347 (2000) (“[F]emale and minority scholars still lag somewhat behind
white men in average citation counts. The differences, however, are small — especially
when compared to other variations in citation rates . . . .”); Gregory Sisk, Measuring Law
Faculty Scholarly Impact by Citations: Reliable and Valid for Collective Faculty Ranking,
60 JURIMETRICS J. 41, 53-54 (2019) (describing how authors have gamed SSRN
downloads).
249
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placement status on citation count.253 In addition, articles in emerging
or less well-studied areas may receive fewer citations at first.254 With
regard to the potential for discrimination, the most recent research
available indicates that work authored by women receives more
citations than articles written by men in the area of legal studies.255
Additionally, the representation of women on the list of highly-cited
scholars has been increasing.256 However, further empirical
investigation about the effects of race and gender on citation would be
useful if citation statistics were to be used in defining the target variable
of quality.257 In addition, these types of metrics will not adequately
capture the quality of a given work on an individual level.258

253 See Crespi, supra note 252, at 901-02; Jeffrey L. Harrison & Amy R. Mashburn,
Citations, Justifications, and the Troubled State of Legal Scholarship: An Empirical Study,
3 TEX. A&M L. REV. 45, 49 (2015) (finding that the “citation of articles by law professors
is highly correlated with the ranking of the review publishing the article and — in the
eyes of other law professors — the prestige of the author’s institutional affiliations”);
see also Leiter, supra note 252, at 469.
254 See Fred R. Shapiro & Michelle Pearse, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles of All
Time, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1483, 1507 (2012) (describing “subject trend[s]” in highlycited articles); Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Legal Scholars, 29 J. LEGAL STUDS. 409,
413 (2000) [hereinafter Legal Scholars] (“Some topics have a much larger scholarly
literature than others. A reasonably prolific commentator on constitutional law will
have far more opportunities to be cited than even the most important writer on wills.”)
255 See Ian Ayres & Fredrick E. Vars, Determinants of Citations to Articles in Elite Law
Reviews, 29 J. LEGAL STUDS. 427, 427 (2000) (“[A]rticles by young, female, or minority
authors are more heavily cited.”); Christopher A. Cotropia & Lee Petherbridge, Gender
Disparity in Law Review Citation Rates, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 771, 799 (2018)
(concluding that “female-authored articles appear generally to be more cited than maleauthored articles in the field of legal studies”). But see Delgado, supra note 252, at 1351;
Merritt, supra note 252, at 347.
256 See Shapiro, Most-Cited Revisited, supra note 201, at 1609-10 (noting that one
percent of the most-cited legal scholars are female, compared with six out of the top
sixteen most-cited younger legal scholars). But see Deo, supra note 150, at 2469
(describing how the COVID-19 pandemic has adversely affected the volume of
submissions by female authors); Angela Onwuachi-Willig, The Intersectional Race and
Gender Effects of the Pandemic in Legal Academia, 72 HASTINGS L.J. 1703, 1706 (2021)
(explaining that the pandemic “left women law faculty with very little of the most
precious commodity needed to produce legal scholarship: time”).
257 See Merritt, supra note 252, at 353.
258 See Shapiro & Pearse, supra note 254, at 1518 (discussing the limitations of
citation metrics, including the lack of qualitative assessment and that a work may be
cited in a negative way); Sisk, supra note 252, at 43 (“No single measure of faculty
scholarly activity can fully capture every individual contribution. For that reason,
evaluating a single professor’s scholarly work requires a nuanced, multifaceted, and
individually focused assessment.”).
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The next Subsection describes challenges in selecting the training
data, including the difficulty of assessing publication quality at the
individual level and constructing a representative training data set.
2.

Encoding Bias in the Training Data

Choices made in selecting the training data can also lead to unfair
outcomes. Machine learning algorithms use training data, which are
past examples, to create models that are applied in new situations.259
Thus, both the selection and representativeness of the training set are
essential. For the former, if bias influences the composition of examples
in the training set, a partially automated system will reproduce the
harmful outcome.260 With regard to representativeness, algorithms may
rely too heavily on insufficient training data from which broader
conclusions are drawn.261 For instance, an artificial intelligence system
for determining if a patient is having a heart attack will have a higher
rate of false negatives for women if the medical records provided to the
system were primarily from male patients.262 Because machine learning
makes predictions based on a limited amount of training data,
deficiencies in the representative nature of the data are magnified and
may harm groups that are not fairly represented in the training data.263
If a machine learning algorithm is trained on limited or biased data,
the resulting model will not be able to provide an accurate prediction
in new situations — a phenomenon known as “overfitting.”264 For
instance, a hiring algorithm trained on resumes primarily submitted by
male applicants might downgrade applications that include women’s
names on them.265 Although screening algorithms have been marketed
to companies as “decision aids” in hiring,266 they often reject a large
share of applications automatically before any human review takes
259 Surden, Machine Learning, supra note 11, at 91-94; see Barocas & Selbst, supra
note 26, at 680-81 (defining “training data” as “the data that train the model to behave
in a certain way”).
260 Barocas & Selbst, supra note 26, at 681-83 (referring to this as a “garbage-ingarbage-out” problem).
261 Id. at 688-90; IBM Cloud Education, Overfitting, IBM (Mar. 3, 2021),
https://www.ibm.com/cloud/learn/overfitting [https://perma.cc/9HBA-5HDM].
262 See Suresh & Guttag, supra note 38, at 1.
263 Barocas & Selbst, supra note 26, at 686.
264 IBM Cloud Education, supra note 261 (defining overfitting as the situation “when
a statistical model fits exactly against its training data” such that “the algorithm
unfortunately cannot perform accurately against unseen data”).
265 See Dastin, supra note 27.
266 Bogen, supra note 24.
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place.267 Problematically, hiring algorithms have based their decisions
on past practices, which often contain significant biases.268 For
example, Amazon developed a hiring tool using artificial intelligence in
an attempt to screen resumes in an efficient manner.269 The
programming team taught the algorithms to identify 50,000 terms that
had been used in applicants’ resumes in the past.270 The technology
ended up allocating minimal weight to frequently-used terms, such as
various programming languages that were common among
applicants.271 However, the tool preferred words that male applicants
tended to use more often, such as “executed.”272 It also learned to
penalize resumes that indicated attendance at certain all-female
universities.273 Similarly, search technology and translation tools have
provided results that reflect gender bias in training data, such as
associating “nurses” with being female and “CEOs” with being male.274
A lack of representative training data has undercut the usefulness and
inclusiveness of many other types of machine learning technologies,
resulting in reputational and social harms.275
267

Id.
Id.
269 See Dastin, supra note 27.
270 Id. (noting that the training data was sourced from applications that Amazon
received, with a majority coming from male applicants).
271 Id.
272 Id.
273 Id.
274 See Sonia K. Katyal, Private Accountability in the Age of Artificial Intelligence, 66
UCLA L. REV. 54, 93-94 (2019) (describing how “only 11 percent of the top 100 ‘CEO’
image search results from Google included women, even though 27 percent of CEOs in
the United States are women”); Matthew Kay, Cynthia Matuszek & Sean A. Munson,
Unequal Representation and Gender Stereotypes in Image Search Results for Occupations,
CHI ‘15: PROC. 33D ANN. ACM CONF. ON HUM. FACTORS COMPUTING SYS. 3819 (2015),
https://doi.org/10.1145/2702123.2702520 [https://perma.cc/BA55-R6AR] (describing
gender-biased results in image searches for occupations); Calo, supra note 10, at 41112 (discussing “problems involving the design and deployment” of artificial
intelligence).
275 See, e.g., Joy Buolamwini & Timnit Gebru, Gender Shades: Intersectional Accuracy
Disparities in Commercial Gender Classification, 81 PROC. MACH. LEARNING RSCH. 1, 1-2
(2018), https://proceedings.mlr.press/v81/buolamwini18a.html [https://perma.cc/A2UEYTE2] (describing how image recognition technology that was trained using data
consisting of primarily Caucasian faces has struggled to recognize diverse individuals);
PATRICK GROTHER, MEI NGAN & KAYEE HANAOKA, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH.
INTERAGENCY OR INTERNAL REP. NO. 8280, FACE RECOGNITION VENDOR TEST (FRVT) PART
3: DEMOGRAPHIC EFFECTS 2 (2019), https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.8280
[https://perma.cc/62MS-2PCK] (concluding that facial recognition technology was
268

2022]

Using Artificial Intelligence

389

In training an algorithm in the context of law review submissions,
different options exist for selecting examples to constitute the training
set. Developers might attempt to replicate the current law review
submissions system by using articles previously published by a broad
selection of journals as the training data.276 In searching for related
articles, JSTOR and ScholarSift both appear to rely upon vast databases
of published law review articles, with JSTOR including interdisciplinary
and primary materials in a variety of other fields as well.277
Alternatively, developers might use publications from journals
ranked above a specified threshold. For instance, developers might
decide to select examples from articles published by the top fifty law
reviews. To the extent the placement of previous submissions
incorporated bias, however, technology-assisted review would simply
enable efficient implementation of past harm.278 Deficient selection of
the examples used to train the algorithm may negatively impact groups
that are not adequately represented in the training data.279 As described
in the previous Subsection, using placement of a publication in a highlyranked journal as an indication of quality could reflect insider influence
and perpetuate discrimination based on race or gender.280 In another
approach, the training set could also include highly-cited or
downloaded articles, regardless of the rank of the law review where they
were published.281 However, citation and download metrics may suffer
from bias and gaming risks, and they may not be accurate in assessing
quality on an individual level.282
In a less feasible scenario, developers might wish to train the
algorithm based on past examples of law review articles that a group of
between 10 and 100 times more likely to misidentify Asian and Black people than white
people).
276 See Amanda Levendowski, How Copyright Law Can Fix Artificial Intelligence’s
Implicit Bias Problem, 93 WASH. L. REV. 579, 619-30 (2018) (describing how the fair use
doctrine could protect the use of copyrighted works in training machine learning
systems); Matthew Sag, Copyright and Copy-Reliant Technology, 103 NW. U. L. REV.
1607, 1608 (2009) (examining whether “a nonexpressive use, which nonetheless
requires copying the entirety of a copyrighted work, [can] be found to infringe the
exclusive rights of the copyright owner”).
277 Shucha, supra note 127, at 103, 107; Home, supra note 12; Text Analyzer: About,
supra note 16; What’s in JSTOR, JSTOR, https://about.jstor.org/whats-in-jstor (last
visited Apr. 21, 2022) [https://perma.cc/Y462-4QET] (describing how it combines
“scholarship and primary sources on one platform”).
278 See Cofone, supra note 55, at 1398.
279 See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 26, at 684-86.
280 See supra Part II.A.2.
281 See supra Part II.B.1.
282 See supra Part II.B.1.
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scholars classified as having a specified level of quality. This method of
constructing the training data set seems unworkable for many reasons.
Most importantly, it seems nearly impossible to obtain sufficient and
representative involvement by legal scholars to develop training data
with an acceptable number of examples of strong articles in a variety of
legal fields to create a reliable predictive model.283 In addition, legal
scholars may not be able to achieve consensus on the definition of a
quality publication.284 The team also might not be able to agree on
whether to produce a training data set that reflects the pool of quality
publications as it currently exists or what it might ideally include to
counterbalance social biases.285 By analogy, in the context of hiring
algorithms, some scholars have argued for constructing a data set to
reflect how the pool might look if it did not have systemic bias.286 For
all these reasons, this last alternative way of developing the training data
set is the least realistic.
The training data would need to contain sufficient examples from
different areas of law, which may be problematic if inclusion in the
training data depends primarily on articles with high citation counts or
downloads. In areas of law that are less well developed, the data that is
available to train algorithms may be incomplete or not representative.287
If the training data comprises insufficient articles in certain fields of
study, like admiralty, the machine learning technology will not be able
to accurately evaluate the thoroughness of research, for example, in
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See Heaven, supra note 32, at 610.
See Surden, Artificial Intelligence and the Law, supra note 23, at 1308-09, 1322-25
(describing how artificial intelligence “tends to work best for activities where there are
underlying patterns, rules, definitive right answers, and semi-formal or formal
structures that make up the process” as opposed to “areas that are conceptual, abstract,
value-laden, open-ended, policy- or judgment-oriented”).
285 Bent, supra note 55, at 807; Cofone, supra note 55, at 1424; see also Bornstein,
supra note 22, at 541-44, 550 (describing “antisubordination theory” and introducing
an “antistereotyping approach” to making algorithms antidiscriminatory).
286 See Anupam Chander, The Racist Algorithm?, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1023, 1041
(2017) (explaining that “the decisionmaker must take race and gender into account in
order to ensure the fairness of the result”); Cofone, supra note 55, at 1424; Pauline T.
Kim, Data-Driven Discrimination at Work, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 857, 887 (2017)
(describing algorithmic bias that “coincides with systematic disadvantage to protected
classes”).
287 See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 189, at 843-44; Barocas & Selbst, supra note
26, at 688-90; Higdon, supra note 1, at 348-49; see also Volokh, supra note 11, at 1168
(“If this training data contains biases (for example, imagine a criminal trial data set in
which the black defendants were convicted 95% of the time but the white defendants
only 75% of the time), the AI’s learning process may incorporate those biases.”).
284
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some submissions. When machine learning technology is trained on
articles from a narrow group of law reviews or from a limited
perspective, the system will not consistently and accurately assign
scores to certain types of submissions.288
The model used in scoring submissions would need to be tested for
validity and reliability. During training, some portion of the identified
set of examples would need to be cordoned off to use later for testing
the system.289 The test data would be used to assess if the machine
learning system was appropriately scoring articles.290 If the machine
learning system did not appropriately score articles in the test data, the
developers would seek to understand why there was a discrepancy.291
3.

Feature Selection and Systemic Bias

Even if a machine learning algorithm is trained with representative
data, it may still reflect embedded systemic bias.292 To mitigate such
bias, developers can decide which features to include for consideration
by a machine learning system. Features are the “observed variables” that
the algorithm is permitted to access in detecting patterns.293 Decisions
as to which features to include can result in unfair outcomes.294 Because
a model cannot adequately represent the complexity of every individual
situation, some groups will be affected by “statistically sound inferences
that are nevertheless inaccurate.”295
As an example, hiring algorithms tend to place undue emphasis on
the reputation of the educational institutions that applicants
attended.296 Decisions that rely on this information will systemically
overlook applicants from protected groups if equivalently competent
applicants graduate from higher-ranked universities at lower rates.297
Barocas and Selbst have analogized the overemphasis on educational
reputation in hiring algorithms to “redlining.”298 Redlining is an
unethical and illegal practice by which financial institutions used broad
288 See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 189, at 843-44; Barocas & Selbst, supra note
26, at 688-90; Higdon, supra note 1, at 348-49.
289 See Lehr & Ohm, supra note 14, at 698 (describing the process of model training).
290 See id.
291 See id.
292 Cofone, supra note 55, at 1404-05.
293 Bent, supra note 55, at 813.
294 See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 26, at 684-86.
295 Id. at 688.
296 See id. at 689.
297 See id.
298 Id.
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criteria, such as neighborhoods, to make distinctions between
subgroups in determining whether racial minorities could obtain a
mortgage.299 Barocas and Selbst argue that overemphasizing the
reputation of the institution from which an applicant graduated
provides minimal insight into an individual’s capability.300 Although
other information could allow for a more accurate and fairer
determination, employers (or hiring algorithms) may choose to focus
on educational reputation because it is cost-efficient to rely on such
readily available information.301
A partially automated screening algorithm for submissions that places
too much weight on the reputation of the author’s institutional
affiliation or the law school they attended could result in discriminatory
effects against minority and female authors, even though any adverse
outcomes are not intentional.302 Scholars have documented issues
related to the lack of diversity at elite schools.303 Despite having similar
capabilities, individuals may be affiliated with or graduate from lessprestigious institutions for reasons correlated with gender, race,
religion, and ethnicity.304 Commentators have argued that such
information tends not to provide a useful indication of competence at
the individual level.305 Biases related to the consideration of educational
reputation or institutional affiliation that currently exist in law review
article selection could be replicated by including such features in a
machine learning algorithm.306
4.

Problematic Proxies

Machine learning systems can also discriminate through the use of
proxies. Although developers might instruct an algorithm to ignore
gender, race, or other protected characteristics, the removed
characteristic can often be ascertained through related proxies, a

299 See RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF HOW OUR
GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA, at vii, 64-67 (2017) (“Banks discriminated with
‘redlining,’ refusing to give mortgages to African Americans . . . .”); Barocas & Selbst,
supra note 26, at 689.
300 Barocas & Selbst, supra note 26, at 689.
301 Id.
302 See supra Part II.A.2.
303 See DEO, supra note 5, at 13.
304 See id. at 14; GRADUATE SCH. OF EDUC., supra note 180.
305 See DEO, supra note 5, at 18; Barocas & Selbst, supra note 26, at 689.
306 See supra Part II.A.2.
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phenomenon known as “redundant encoding.”307 For example,
although gender might be excluded from a hiring algorithm, the overall
tenure of employment could serve as a proxy for gender, if a greater
number of women than men on average take leave from the workforce
to have children.308 Consequently, removing the protected
characteristic as a variable for the algorithm to consider does not
preclude the algorithm from considering related correlations, which can
result in discriminatory effects.309
An algorithm that excluded protected characteristics from
consideration in screening law review submissions might still raise
concerns. Citations to articles from certain areas of law, such as critical
race theory, or even to diverse authors might be a proxy for race.310 An
algorithm that assigned a lower score to the use of certain phrases might
reproduce existing biases.311 Considering the law school that the author
attended in a screening algorithm could redundantly encode protected
characteristics in a way that allows for algorithmic discrimination on
the basis of race, gender, or religion.312 Similarly, acknowledgments in
an author’s biographical footnote can serve as an indication of quality,
but they may also reveal “potential entrenchment of existing academic
privilege” or serve as a proxy for race or gender.313
307 Prince & Schwarcz, supra note 237, at 1275 (concluding that “AIs can and will
use training data to derive less intuitive proxies for directly predictive characteristics
when they are deprived of direct data on these characteristics due to legal
prohibitions”).
308 Kroll et al., supra note 18, at 681 (explaining that “women who leave a job to
have children lower the average job tenure for all women, causing this metric to be a
known proxy for gender in hiring applications”).
309 See Bent, supra note 55, at 816 (describing “approaches to algorithmic fairness
. . . [that] take protected characteristics into account”); Prince & Schwarcz, supra note
237, at 1266-67 (explaining how “laws that prohibit discrimination based on directly
predictive characteristics must adapt to combat proxy discrimination” and providing “a
menu of potential strategies” to ascertain whether artificial intelligence is engaging in
proxy discrimination).
310 See Nunna et al., supra note 178; Tietz & Price, supra note 4, at 346.
311 See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 26, at 679-80 (describing how “different choices
for the target variable . . . may have a greater or lesser adverse impact on protected
classes”); Bent, supra note 55, at 811 (explaining that “the way the user defines and
assigns a specific value to the target variable, if correlated with a protected
characteristic, could unintentionally trigger a disparate impact”); Clements, supra note
31, at 4-6.
312 See Prince & Schwarcz, supra note 237, at 1272 (explaining that “proxy
discrimination can be either intentional or unintentional”).
313 Tietz & Price, supra note 4, at 346; see also Nunna et al., supra note 178 (finding
that “authors tend to acknowledge scholars from peer schools, most of all their own
school, but also to typically acknowledge folks from somewhat fancier schools” and
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Although there are significant risks associated with implementing
technology-assisted review of law review submissions, the next Section
will describe how to examine its potential benefits and harms as
compared with the current submissions process.
C. Not Letting Perfection Be the Enemy of the Good
Artificial intelligence does not have to be perfect to be useful, though
developers should continue to improve upon it. If an autonomous
vehicle can perform at least as well as a human driver, it is a worthwhile
technology, even if it needs to be refined.314 The use of technologyassisted review may provide superior outcomes to human editors acting
alone. By analogy, Stanford University recently offered automated
feedback to students using artificial intelligence in one of its online
computer programming courses.315 In online education, a course may
have thousands of students, so instructors may not be able to provide
the ideal amount of feedback to students.316 During the online course at
Stanford, the automated system gave 16,000 instances of feedback, with
which students agreed 97.9 percent of the time.317 Surprisingly,
students agreed with the feedback they received from human
instructors less often — only 96.7 percent of the time.318 The use of
automated scoring is not well suited, however, for “original research
pieces.”319
As another example, Google Translate offers automated translation
where resources for translation might not otherwise exist.320 It would
be unwise to depend on Google Translate for important decisions, like
understanding a plea agreement in a different language. However,
Google Translate can be useful where one might not otherwise have
access to translation tools, such as when communicating with a local
resident.321 Similarly, if technology-assisted review allows for additional
“men are acknowledged more than women and nonbinary scholars, and white scholars
more than scholars of color”).
314 See Volokh, supra note 11, at 1139 (noting that “ordinary drivers don’t set that
high a bar”).
315 Metz, supra note 40.
316 Id.
317 Id.
318 Id.
319 Stephen P. Balfour, Assessing Writing in MOOCs: Automated Essay Scoring and
Calibrated Peer Review, 8 RSCH. & PRAC. ASSESSMENT 40, 46 (2013).
320 Surden, Machine Learning, supra note 11, at 100; Translation AI, supra note 40.
321 Surden, Machine Learning, supra note 11, at 100; Translation AI, supra note 40.
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opportunities for authors facing other heuristic biases,322 it may still be
worth using in limited circumstances and with appropriate oversight.
Results from a recent empirical study suggest that some authors
might even prefer technology-assisted review to the current selection
process.323 The study demonstrated that users have a significant
preference for automated decision-making when it provides “benefits in
speed, cost, or accuracy.”324 Although they have a “mild” preference for
human decision-making when the stakes increase, their preference can
be overcome by “more concrete considerations, such as speed or cost,
and by the default setting.”325 A technology-assisted review system for
streamlining the law review submissions process would not automate
decision-making; it still requires a human editor to evaluate a
submission. Nevertheless, the study’s results seem to support the idea
that some authors might prefer a partially automated system based on
the benefits it would offer in terms of speed and perhaps accuracy326 —
at least for authors confronting biases.
Despite these possible benefits, partial automation of the law review
submissions process may simply enable efficient implementation of
flawed practices without the possibility of “technological due process”
for authors.327 The next Part will describe how some of the potential
harms associated with technology-assisted review of submissions might
be addressed.
III. OVERSEEING ALGORITHMS IN IMPLEMENTATION
Implementing an artificial intelligence system to streamline the law
review submissions process will be time-consuming, costly, and involve
risks.328 The training data will need to include vast amounts of
publications from a multitude of different subject areas. Although law
322 See Volokh, supra note 11, at 1140 (describing how the use of artificial
intelligence can help with both efficiency and accessibility).
323 See Derek E. Bambauer & Michael Risch, Worse Than Human?, 53 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
1091, 1094-97 (2022).
324 Id. at 1094.
325 Id.
326 See id.
327 See Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for
Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 5, 8 (2014) (“There is nothing unbiased
about scoring systems.”).
328 See Andrew Ng, AI Doesn’t Have to Be Too Complicated or Expensive for Your
Business, HARV. BUS. REV. (July 29, 2021), https://hbr.org/2021/07/ai-doesnt-have-to-be-toocomplicated-or-expensive-for-your-business [https://perma.cc/6BRH-D5D2] (describing
how “the economics of an individual project might not support hiring a large, dedicated
AI team”).
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schools and journals will benefit from the system, they may lack the
financial resources or expertise to develop individualized artificial
intelligence systems.329 Instead, private companies will likely develop
the partially automated screening technology coupled with their own
submissions system or with the goal of selling the technology to other
submissions services like Scholastica.330
Artificial intelligence systems can exacerbate underlying unfairness,
as they enable bias to be embedded consistently in a system.331
Mechanisms should be instituted to address some of the potential harms
previously discussed. To the extent that racism, sexism, or other types
of bias that taint the current selection process are replicated in a
partially automated system, attempts to debias the system would merely
be performative.332 By incorporating “impartiality by design” and
“impartiality by testing” mechanisms, developers could implement
measures to minimize the risks of harm.333 The earlier Sections of this
Article describe ways to design the system to reduce the potential for
adverse outcomes, including ensuring careful feature selection and
representative training data.334 For instance, developers could set up the
system to disregard specific attributes, such as the author’s name, to
prevent gender or racial bias. However, some commentators have
argued for the consideration of such information to ensure fairness.335
329 See Robert Anderson on Analytics for Law Review Submissions and Publishing, supra
note 126, at 24:34-28:05.
330 See id. at 3:33-5:40, 24:34-28:05.
331 See Cofone, supra note 55, at 1398 (“Automated decision-making . . . brings
perfect consistency across decisions.”); Pauline T. Kim, Big Data and Artificial
Intelligence: New Challenges for Workplace Equality, 57 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 313, 32122 (2019) [hereinafter Big Data and AI] (describing how an algorithm that “makes
predictions across cases or populations in a way that is systematically wrong or biased
. . . raises much broader social concerns”).
332 See Pauline T. Kim, Auditing Algorithms for Discrimination, 166 U. PA. L. REV.
ONLINE 189, 191 (2017) (arguing that “the causes of bias often lie not in the code, but
in broader social processes”); Kim, Big Data and AI, supra note 331, at 320 (“If the
employer’s prior hiring practices excluded certain groups . . . the algorithm will simply
reproduce the previously existing biases.”); Kroll et al., supra note 18, at 681
(concluding that “if discrimination is already systemic, new data will retain the
discriminatory impact”); Sandra G. Mayson, Bias In, Bias Out, 128 YALE L.J. 2218, 2251
(2019) (explaining “what prediction does is identify patterns in past data and offer them
as projections about future events”).
333 Volokh, supra note 11, at 1168-69.
334 See supra Part II.B.
335 See Bent, supra note 55, at 807 (stating that “the best way to get fair algorithmic
results is not by hiding the protected trait, but instead by using the protected trait to set
a fairness constraint within the algorithm design”); Chander, supra note 286, at 1041
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For impartiality by testing, developers or an oversight organization
could test for “potentially prejudiced emergent properties” and work to
address unfairness as they observe it.336 Returning to the example of
Amazon’s hiring algorithm, developers realized that the tool ended up
teaching itself to downgrade resumes that mentioned women’s
colleges.337 Although Amazon decided to discard its hiring tool as a
result,338 developers might be able to adjust the system in some
circumstances to mitigate any harmful effects.339
The discussion below will summarize possible oversight measures to
address bias in implementing an artificial intelligence system to help
review law journal submissions. It will discuss the importance of
regularly auditing the outcomes of a technology-assisted review system,
as well as the benefits and limits of transparency. In some
circumstances, developers can design a system to ensure greater
accountability than transparency alone would accomplish.340 This Part
will also set forth potential future applications of artificial intelligence
in the law review submissions process.
A. Regular Auditing
Auditing is the independent assessment of whether a system
conforms to applicable standards and procedures, as well as to discover
any interference with the operation of the system.341 A consortium of
law reviews, or a group like the Association of American Law Schools
(“AALS”), could require independent oversight and regular auditing of
algorithmic systems used in technology-assisted review of submissions.
The oversight group should consist of a team diverse in thought,
demographics, and background to oversee regular audits of the
technology. Similar to obligations imposed on employers in auditing

(arguing for the inclusion of race and gender in algorithmic decision-making to reduce
unfairness); Kroll et al., supra note 18, at 685 (“Blindness to a sensitive attribute has
long been recognized as an insufficient approach to making a process fair.”); Prince &
Schwarcz, supra note 237, at 1302-03 (explaining that prohibiting consideration of
protected characteristics “may effectively prevent traditional intentional proxy
discrimination,” but artificial intelligence “will inevitably identify other proxy variables
for directly predictive data”).
336 Volokh, supra note 11, at 1169.
337 See Dastin, supra note 27.
338 Id.
339 See Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249,
1310 (2008) (“Rigorous testing reflects a norm of proper software development.”).
340 Kroll et al., supra note 18, at 637.
341 Id. at 660-61.

398

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 56:347

their hiring algorithms,342 the oversight group would require inspection
of partially automated systems to protect against adverse impacts
against certain groups and debias screening algorithms as much as
possible.343 It would confirm that the technology-assisted review system
was reliably and consistently assigning scores.344 The group would also
engage in quality assessment on an ongoing basis to minimize the
likelihood that the technology perpetuates bias.345
Developers should design the system in a way that allows for
accountability, enabling oversight to ensure that any specified rules
have been applied consistently.346 In addition to ensuring “procedural
regularity”347 in the system’s implementation, an oversight group
should also evaluate whether the rules used in screening are justified.
The group would require analysis of data related to the submissions to
determine if bias might exist in the algorithm.348 One advantage of some
342 See, e.g., UNIF. GUIDELINES ON EMP. SELECTION PROCS. (EQUAL EMPL. OPPORTUNITY
COMM’N 2021), https://www.uniformguidelines.com/uniformguidelines.html#20 (last
visited July 25, 2021) [https://perma.cc/E5TL-8K67] (setting forth “a framework for
determining the proper use of . . . selection procedures” in employment, including
standards for validity studies); see also Ifeoma Ajunwa, An Auditing Imperative for
Automated Hiring Systems, 34 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 621, 659-73 (2021) (describing the
benefits of mandating internal and external audits in the use of hiring algorithms).
343 See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 26, at 715-16 (suggesting that various data
points be tested to reduce disparate impact while still maintaining accuracy); Citron &
Pasquale, supra note 327, at 18-30 (stressing the importance of auditing for scoring
systems to mitigate potential harm); Rebecca Crootof, Margot E. Kaminski & W.
Nicholson Price II, Humans in the Loop, 76 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2023),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4066781 [https://perma.cc/RG99AH57] (“Accuracy is a critical factor in evaluating the utility of any decisionmaking
system. However, an emphasis on accuracy brings its own complexity. False and true
positives and negatives often differ in seriousness . . . .”); Kroll et al., supra note 18, at
695-705 (describing how technological tools can be used to mitigate unfairness in
automated decision-making and suggesting the need for computer scientists and law
makers to work together in addressing bias).
344 See Lehr & Ohm, supra note 14, at 698.
345 See, e.g., Andrew D. Selbst, Disparate Impact in Big Data Policing, 52 GA. L. REV.
109, 118-19, 168-82 (2017) (proposing that companies provide “algorithmic impact
statements” to disclose the anticipated effectiveness and possible disparate impact of a
given technology and possible alternatives); DILLON REISMAN, JASON SCHULTZ, KATE
CRAWFORD & MEREDITH WHITTAKER, ALGORITHMIC IMPACT ASSESSMENTS: A PRACTICAL
FRAMEWORK FOR PUBLIC AGENCY ACCOUNTABILITY 4 (2018), https://ainowinstitute.org/
aiareport2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/LU23-ZSAQ] (describing the key elements of an
algorithmic impact assessment).
346 Kroll et al., supra note 18, at 637.
347 Id. at 656-57.
348 See Citron, supra note 339, at 1310-11.
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types of artificial intelligence systems over human decision makers is
that biases and “faulty logic” are “literally coded” in algorithms.349
Subsequent reviewers can sometimes detect bias, whether conscious or
unconscious, when auditing the system.350 Enabling this type of
oversight would require journals to collect demographic information
from authors, preferably on a voluntary basis with consent obtained for
the use of the information in this manner. Journals should advise
authors if their information will be used for any other purpose,
including for screening. For example, research might discover that the
algorithm has relied on features correlated with race that result in lower
scores assigned to papers written by people of color. Such revelations
should cause developers to examine the technology to understand why
the imbalance occurred.351
Technical approaches might alleviate some of the risks of stereotypes
inherent in the natural language processing used by machine learning
models.352 For example, researchers have proposed a technique for
developing gender-neutral models without sacrificing functionality.353
Their proposed solution identified gender-neutral words while using
word vectors that represent meanings of the word.354 Using the
researchers’ model, the word “programmer” would be gender-neutral
by definition.355 In contrast, for a standard training model, the word
“programmer” is associated more closely with “male” than “female.”356
Ideally, similar technical approaches would be incorporated in the
design of the partially automated system, and they might also be used
in response to disparities revealed through auditing. Author-related
attributes could be included as part of the data to train the machine
learning models to avoid bias and allow for auditing.357 However,

349

Cofone, supra note 55, at 1411.
See id.
351 See id.
352 See Deven R. Desai & Joshua A. Kroll, Trust but Verify: A Guide to Algorithms and
the Law, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 5 (2017) (describing technical approaches to address
the risks of stereotypes inherent in natural language processing).
353 JIEYU ZHAO, YICHAO ZHOU, ZEYU LI, WEI WANG & KAI-WEI CHANG, LEARNING
GENDER-NEUTRAL WORD EMBEDDINGS 4847 (2018), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1809.01496.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8F3R-ALX7].
354 Id.
355 Id.
356 Id.
357 See Andrew D. Selbst & Solon Barocas, The Intuitive Appeal of Explainable
Machines, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1085, 1130-37 (2018).
350
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technical approaches to mitigating algorithmic bias can be challenging,
incomplete, and costly.358
B. Transparency and Its Limits
Some measure of oversight can be ensured through transparency.359
The developers of the machine learning system should indicate how
they selected the oversight team and its composition. They should
describe how they selected the training data set. For example,
developers could indicate if they are relying on publications from the
top fifty journals, highly-cited articles, or some combination.
Developers should also indicate which author attributes the algorithm
considers or will not consider, such as gender, race, or institutional
affiliation.
Law reviews should be more transparent as well. They should disclose
how many submissions they receive and how many offers they make
each cycle, as well as the degree to which they have implemented a
partially automated system. Regular reports of publication offer rates
among law reviews could be useful information for authors, regardless
of whether the law review editors are using a partially automated
screening system. If a law review does use artificial intelligence
technology, it should also release information about how it uses the data
about each submission. For example, law reviews should describe if
they provide a review of all submissions regardless of their assigned
scores or only those submissions that receive a score above a specified
threshold. They should specify to what extent they engage in
anonymous review of submissions.
Editors could agree to a code of ethics that would set forth measures
taken to ensure the use of machine learning technology does not result
in unfair screening.360 They should examine whether the stated goals of
their journals align with the implementation of partially automated
screening software. Editors might commit to providing double-blind
358

See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 26, at 716-19.
See Citron & Pasquale, supra note 327, at 24-25 (explaining that scoring systems
should be transparent in light of their potential for harm); Selbst & Barocas, supra note
357, at 1087-88 (maintaining that transparency in automated decision-making should
include a description of how a model has been developed). But see Kroll et al., supra
note 18, at 657-60 (concluding that “it is often necessary to keep secret the elements of
a decision policy, the computer systems that implement it, key inputs, or the outcome”
to “prevent strategic ‘gaming’ of a system”).
360 See generally Katyal, supra note 274, at 108-15 (recommending that computer
scientists and software engineers adopt codes of conduct).
359
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review for a feasible number of articles each submissions cycle, perhaps
those that have received above a specified score by the screening
algorithm.361 However, editors should be cognizant of the limitations of
algorithms in the submissions process and not defer too greatly to
scores assigned by the system. Similar to the classification of documents
that are likely irrelevant in litigation document review described
previously,362 partially automated screening in the context of law review
submissions will be much better at identifying clearly deficient
submissions than discerning stronger ones.363 To mitigate potential
harm, editors could also agree to a random review of a certain number
of articles that were assigned low scores by the technology.364 The
random selection would require that the reviewing editors were not
aware that the set of articles had been assigned low scores by the
screening tool. This ongoing randomized review and assessment would
help ensure reliability and identify potential bias.365 To assist authors
without institutional support, law reviews or submission services
should also provide a template for authors who may be unaware of
standardized formatting as well as a no-cost submission method.366
Providing complete transparency about the partially automated
screening system would be problematic. The data or technology used in
the system may be protected by intellectual property law.367 In addition,
361

See Rostron & Levit, supra note 8; Thomson, supra note 3, at 226, 262.
See supra Part I.A; Surden, Machine Learning, supra note 11, at 101-02.
363 See Surden, Machine Learning, supra note 11, at 98.
364 See Kroll et al., supra note 18, at 639 (explaining that “while transparency of a
rule makes reviewing the basis of decisions more possible, it is not a substitute for
individualized review of particular decisions”).
365 See id. at 684 (stating that “if the algorithm is designed to incorporate an element
of randomness . . . the validity of the initial assumptions can be tested and the accuracy
and fairness of the entire system will benefit over time”); see also Citron & Pasquale,
supra note 327, at 18 (describing how “scoring systems have the potential to take a life
of their own, contributing to or creating the situation they claim to merely predict”).
366 See VOLOKH, supra note 157, at 290 (providing a link to a template for formatting
the submission).
367 See Clark D. Asay, Artificial Stupidity, 61 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1187, 1194-97
(2020) (examining how intellectual property rights affect the development of artificial
intelligence systems); Jeanne C. Fromer, Machines as the New Oompa-Loompas: Trade
Secrecy, the Cloud, Machine Learning, and Automation, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 706, 708 (2019)
(arguing that the use of trade secret to protect machine learning technology is
excessive); Kroll et al., supra note 18, at 639 (“[D]isclosure of the data may be
undesirable or even legally barred.”); Mark A. Lemley & Bryan Casey, Fair Learning, 99
TEX. L. REV. 743, 757-58 (2021) (discussing “copyright in the individual components
of the database” used to train machine learning systems); Levendowski, supra note 276,
at 619-30 (discussing how invoking fair use might create fairer AI systems); Brenda M.
Simon & Ted Sichelman, Data-Generating Patents, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 377, 383 (2017)
362
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some aspects of the technology or data may affect the proprietary
interests of the creator or users of the algorithm.368 In some
circumstances, regulations or statutes prevent disclosure of certain
types of data.369 Additionally, machine learning technology is not
always able to provide a complete explanation of its decision-making
process.370 As new articles are published and the machine learning
technology updates its system, developers might not be able to explain
the reasoning behind changes to the scoring mechanism.371
Even when explanation is possible, complete disclosure of the details
of the partially automated screening system might lead some authors to
tailor their submissions.372 Authors would be more likely to tweak
variables that are easy to adjust, such as the length of an article or the
footnote-to-text ratio, than those that are difficult to alter, such as the
analysis of pertinent scholarship.373 Even without complete disclosure,
some savvy individuals might be able to reverse engineer the system to

(describing the use of patents and trade secrets as complementary forms of protection
for data-generating inventions).
368 See Kroll et al., supra note 18, at 639 (“[D]isclosure of the data may be
undesirable or even legally barred.”); W. Nicholson Price II & Arti K. Rai, Clearing
Opacity Through Machine Learning, 106 IOWA L. REV. 775, 788 (2021) (“[A] machinelearning developer may, for reasons of competitive advantage, want to maintain secrecy
over one or more of the following aspects of its work product: the learning algorithm’s
source code, associated parameters, the training data, training process, or the resulting
model.”).
369 See, e.g., Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (FERPA), 20 U.S.C.
§ 1232g (2018) (law regulating the privacy of educational records).
370 See FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT
CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION 6-17 (2015) (describing the secrecy and complexity
of algorithms); Citron & Pasquale, supra note 327, at 6 (defining black boxes); Desai &
Kroll, supra note 352, at 5 (explaining that “fundamental limitations on the analysis of
software meaningfully limit the interpretability of even full disclosures of software
source code”); Kroll et al., supra note 18, at 658 (explaining that sometimes “the
purpose of the automated decision process is to determine something not directly
measurable”); Selbst & Barocas, supra note 357, at 1088 (describing explanation as “a
way to evaluate the basis of decision-making against broader normative constraints such
as antidiscrimination or due process”).
371 See Kroll et al., supra note 18, at 660 (describing how “transparency alone does
little to explain either why any particular decision was made or how fairly the system
operates”).
372 See id. at 657-60; Jane Bambauer & Tal Zarsky, The Algorithm Game, 94 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1, 4 (2018) (describing different types of gaming).
373 See CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION: HOW BIG DATA INCREASES
INEQUALITY AND THREATENS DEMOCRACY 53-65 (2016); Kroll et al., supra note 18, at 658
n.79.
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gain a strategic advantage in submission.374 Such gaming would thwart
the objective of technology-assisted review — the efficient and reliable
identification of submissions that are unlikely to benefit from further
evaluation.
C. Imagining Potential Future Implementation
In a hypothetical future implementation, a machine learning system
might be able to assign a score to a submission by analyzing substantive
features associated with higher quality articles and identifying patterns
in submissions using NLP techniques.375 Based on the patterns, the
system could assign a score to indicate the predicted strength of a
submission, helping editors decide whether it should receive further
evaluation. For example, one group of researchers has used machine
learning techniques that include “domain-oriented features” to improve
the automated evaluation of quality of medical articles on Wikipedia.376
A major problem with this imagined future application is the inability
of artificial intelligence to carry out abstract analysis.377 For example, in
filtering spam messages, the goal is typically efficiency rather than
accuracy.378 By contrast, the use of proxies for quality to score
submissions may result in false positives (where weaker submissions
will be scored highly) and false negatives (where stronger articles will
receive low scores).379 These errors could result in substantial harm to
authors and readers of scholarly literature.380 Although the sheer
number of law reviews and the availability of public databases for
publications limit the risk that the public will be deprived of a paper,

374 But see Citron & Pasquale, supra note 327, at 11 (describing the difficulty of
reverse engineering credit scores).
375 See Brian S. Haney, Applied Natural Language Processing for Law Practice, 2020
B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F. 1, 2.
376 VITTORIA COZZA, MARINELLA PETROCCHI & ANGELO SPOGNARDI, A MATTER OF
WORDS: NLP FOR QUALITY EVALUATION OF WIKIPEDIA MEDICAL ARTICLES, in
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON WEB ENGINEERING 448-56 (2016) (using machine
learning techniques that consider “domain-relevant features” to automatically evaluate
the quality of medical articles on Wikipedia). But see Checco et al., supra note 40, at 4
(observing that “assessing the quality of complex documents by automated means is
still a challenging problem”).
377 See Surden, Machine Learning, supra note 11, at 97-100 (observing that “many
complicated problems . . . may not be amenable to such a heuristic-based technique”).
378 See id. at 98.
379 See id. at 99-100.
380 See id.
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readers also rely on heuristics, including law review placement, to
determine which pieces to read and cite.381
Machine learning techniques used to identify substantive
considerations in prior published articles are unlikely to provide
accurate scores for submissions that are novel.382 Where the number of
examples provided in a given area are insufficient, such as in a nascent
area of legal study, machine learning may fail to identify patterns that
are reliable predictors of submissions that should receive a high score.383
Partially automated screening tools also might not consider the
improving quality of submissions in an emerging area over time.384
Consequently, predicting the substantive elements that a strong
submission should contain to receive a high score in a consistent and
fair manner will be extremely difficult, if not impossible.
CONCLUSION
Artificial intelligence has the potential to increase efficiency while
minimizing bias in the law review submissions process, but it may cause
significant harm. At the present, editors can benefit from technology
that simplifies preemption checking, detects plagiarism, evaluates
compliance with technical requirements, and formats citations. By
partially automating these tasks, artificial intelligence can provide
editors the time they need to review submissions that are likely to
benefit from additional consideration. Partially automated technology
could also provide a means for evaluating selection decisions, revealing
partiality in human reviewers.
Notwithstanding these potential benefits, using artificial intelligence
in the submissions process involves substantial risks. A partially
automated system may codify bias into the selection process if the data
used in training the system does not reflect the breadth of submissions
in different areas or if human biases are incorporated into the system.
Some of these adverse outcomes can be addressed through attentive
design, measured transparency, and regular audits. Despite its
shortcomings, using artificial intelligence in the law review submissions
381 See Heifetz, supra note 7, at 632 (describing how the selection of articles by
editors can “shape the professional literature for consumption by academics, judges,
and practicing attorneys”).
382 See Lehr & Ohm, supra note 14, at 680; Surden, Machine Learning, supra note 11,
at 105.
383 See Shapiro & Pearse, supra note 254, at 1507; Shapiro, Legal Scholars, supra note
254, at 413.
384 See Checco et al., supra note 40, at 9.
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process may still be worth considering in limited circumstances. With
circumscribed application and careful oversight, technology-assisted
review offers the potential to bring about an improved submissions
experience.

